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ASYMMETRIES IN THE GENERATION  
AND TRANSMISSION OF WEALTH 
 
FELIX B. CHANG †    
This Article assigns a redistributive role to the legal rules of 
trusts and estates. Unlike business law, trusts and estates has lagged 
in articulating a comprehensive theory on inequality. Consequently, 
income inequality is compounded intergenerationally as wealth 
inequality, with dire consequences for economic productivity and 
social stability. To move the discourse on wealth inequality, this 
Article explores the divergent approaches toward inequality in 
business law and trusts and estates. 
Additionally, this Article recasts trusts and estates’ legal rules 
as wealth transfer mechanisms. Four categories of rules are 
implicated: (1) rules that interact with the tax system, (2) rules that 
govern relations between beneficiaries and creditors, (3) rules that 
govern relations between beneficiaries and trustees, and (4) rules that 
govern relations among beneficiaries. 
More broadly, this Article contributes to three lines of 
scholarly debates. The first revolves around the propriety of drawing 
analogies between trust law and the law of enterprise organization. 
The second is whether legal rules or the tax system better effectuates 
redistribution. The third is whether legal rules should reflect our 
notions of fairness or welfare. 
 
  
 
 † Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. BA, Yale; JD, 
Michigan. E-mail: felix.chang@uc.edu. I am indebted to Tom Gallanis for his 
insightful comments. Thanks, too, to Lee-ford Tritt and Deborah Gordon. This 
Article benefited greatly from the “Sex, Death, and Taxes” panel at the 2017 annual 
meeting of the American Association of Law Schools. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the law on the transmission of wealth (i.e., trusts and 
estates) has been insulated from the pushback against inequality 
sweeping through the laws governing the generation of wealth (e.g., 
business law). In recent years, corporate law has advanced a team 
production theory of the firm and sought to rein in executive 
compensation,1 while antitrust has debated the ties between market 
power and inequality.2 Trusts and estates, meanwhile, has confined 
this discourse primarily to the estate tax and, to a lesser extent, a 
handful of issues such as dynasty trusts, spendthrift and asset 
protection trusts, and intestate succession.3 For the most part, 
however, trusts and estates has lacked a coherent and unifying 
approach toward inequality.4 
This is not altogether surprising. The generation of wealth is a 
team effort where multiple constituencies might have played a role—
and therefore can stake a claim—in the output. Hence, arguments for 
pay equity have some moral force. By contrast, when wealth is to be 
gratuitously transferred on an individual basis, the transferees might 
be unborn parties who did not contribute to the accumulation of 
wealth. Here the law tends to defer to the preferences of testators and 
settlors, displacing those preferences only under limited 
circumstances.5 This tendency is reinforced by social norms toward 
diligence and success that enable dead hand control.6 
 
1 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (seminal work on the team production 
theory); 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-21 (shareholder approval of executive compensation). 
2 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 
1171 (2016). 
3 See Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax 
to Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2013); 
Pamela Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 
89 OR. L. REV. 453 (2010); Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts, Conservation 
Servitudes, and the Problem of the Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2526 (2006); 
Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 
53 B.C. L. REV. 877 (2012) [hereinafter Weisbord, Wills for Everyone]. 
4 Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, A Critical Research Agenda for Wills, 
Trusts, and Estates, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 317, 340 (2014). 
5 For a summary, see Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante 
versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2013) [hereinafter Kelly, 
Restricting Testamentary Freedom]. 
6 For a summary, see Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory 
of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 6-8 (1992). On the centrality of freedom of 
testation in American succession law, see RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE 
LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 6-7 (2010). On the evolution of 
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Nonetheless, this deficiency in trusts and estates law has left 
wealth inequality with little redress. In fact, the wealth gap is even 
larger than the income gap and has been steadily growing,7 with dire 
consequences for society.8 Inequality hampers economic growth, 
thwarts democracy, erodes public health, and foments social 
instability, political unrest, and racial injustice.9 Inequality is firmly 
entrenched and self-perpetuating. Its many distortionary effects are 
both a cause and a symptom of the concentration of economic and 
political power in the hands of the very few at the expense of the great 
many.   
To provoke discourse on wealth inequality within trusts and 
estates, this Article compares the law’s treatment toward the 
generation versus the dissemination of wealth and advances a vision 
that integrates these two components. The Article analogizes the legal 
system governing wealth to a unified system, where localized 
imperfections can raise inequality unless corrected elsewhere.10 For 
instance, in business law, a singular devotion to shareholder primacy 
spurs income inequality, which in turn compounds wealth inequality 
when the estate tax fails to arrest the velocity of disparity over several 
generations. 
In taking the first steps toward a unifying theory on inequality, 
this Article focuses on non-tax aspects of trusts and estates. Currently, 
the principal mechanism of redistribution in trusts and estates is the 
tax system. However, as a matter of political reality, the estate tax 
simply has too little traction—and, in the current political climate, is 
likely to be repealed.11 As a matter of broader academic trends, 
examining the redistributive propensity of other areas within trusts and 
estates mirrors similar conversations in antitrust, corporate law, and 
financial regulation that are all occurring outside the ambit of tax 
policy. 
 
the term “dead hand control,” see Daniel B. Kelly, Trust Term Extension: An 
Economic Analysis, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 85, 87-88 (2015) [hereinafter Kelly, Trust 
Term Extension]. 
7 On the distinction between wealth inequality and income inequality, see Strand, 
supra note 3, at 458-59. 
8 For a summary of the literature, see James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and 
Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 831-49 (2001). 
9 See infra Section II.B.2. 
10 See Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in 
Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 
1126 (2004) (arguing that redistributive goals are better accomplished on a case-by-
case basis). 
11 See infra Section II.B. See also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A 
THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005). 
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Assigning a redistributive role to trusts and estates can be 
controversial,12 but this Article presents a roadmap for working 
through potential pitfalls. As an initial step, we define “redistribution” 
as a reduction in income or wealth inequality.13 Next, we note that 
redistribution is most efficiently accomplished when there is a transfer 
from the rich to the poor. Scholars disagree on whether legal rules or 
the tax system can better effectuate this transfer.14 With due 
consideration to that debate, this Article examines the redistributive 
propensities of trusts and estates’ legal rules—specifically, the rules 
most likely to govern interactions between rich and poor players. Here 
the analogy to business law loses its force. Whereas a variety of 
players from different stations come together to generate wealth, the 
gratuitous transfer of wealth tends to involve families or other units 
that are likely to be more economically uniform.  
To advance the discourse on where trusts and estates is poised 
to assume redistributive roles, this Article examines four subsets of 
legal rules: (1) rules that interact with the tax-and-transfer system (e.g., 
the rule against perpetuities), (2) rules that govern relations between 
grantors and beneficiaries on one hand and creditors on the other (e.g., 
spendthrift and asset protection trusts), (3) rules that govern relations 
between beneficiaries and trustees (e.g., fiduciary duties), and (4) rules 
that govern relations among beneficiaries (e.g., abatement, ademption, 
cy pres, and execution formalities). The thrust of this exercise is to 
infuse the discourse on redistribution with theoretical frameworks 
from law and economics. 
Counterarguments abound. For example, legal rules which 
redistribute wealth might add to distortions in the tax system—the so-
called “double distortion” argument.15 Within trusts and estates, 
 
12 See infra Section II.A. 
13 This is the general understanding in economics. See PETER LAMBERT, THE 
DISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 37-39 (3rd ed. 2001). 
14 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient 
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) 
[hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient]; Chris 
Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 
(2001); Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On The Limits of Redistributive 
Taxation: Establishing a Case for Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1 
(2005). 
15 The “double distortion” argument in law economics holds that a rule which 
redistributes income only adds to the economic distortions already present in the tax 
system. See Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 
14. For instance, taxes cause labor/leisure distortions: an individual taxed at a 40% 
rate will find work to be less attractive than leisure and will work less. David A. 
Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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adherence to efficiency (or, more precisely, welfare) over testator or 
settlor intent is particularly controversial.16 Additionally, excessive 
tinkering with testamentary instruments might drive trusts offshore or 
toward other favorable jurisdictions.17 Finally, viewing the laws 
governing generation and transmission of wealth as a closed system 
violates economic principles on how wealth moves.18 This Article 
addresses each criticism in turn. 
Part II of this Article dissects the asymmetrical approaches of 
business law and trusts and estates toward inequality. Part III recasts 
trusts and estates’ legal rules as wealth transfer mechanisms. Part IV 
advances a framework for applying these rules to serve distributive 
ends. Here the governing principles will be (1) the management of 
spillover effects between rules governing the transmission of wealth 
and rules governing the generation of wealth, (2) the proper balance 
between the goals of fairness and welfare, and (3) maximizing 
distributive efficiency. 
 
II. ASYMMETRICAL APPROACHES TOWARD INEQUALITY 
Laws governing the generation of wealth are infused with 
principles that can redress inequality. However, as currently 
conceived, laws governing the transmission of wealth are poorly 
suited to tackle inequality and, in fact, can exacerbate it. This Section 
introduces the conundrum by citing examples from corporate law, 
antitrust, and financial regulation, in contradistinction to trusts and 
estates. This Section then examines the consequences of the 
asymmetry. 
 
439, 440-41 (2003). When a legal rule becomes a vehicle for redistribution—for 
example, if wealthy tortfeasors have to pay greater damages than poor tortfeasors—
there is both the labor/leisure distortion and a distortion relative to the rule. 
Individuals might “take too much or too little care, breach contracts inappropriately, 
under- or over-invest in property, and so on.” Id. at 447. For a fuller discussion, see 
infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.  
16 See Lee-Ford Tritt, The Limits of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579 (2011); Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom, supra 
note 5. Welfare is the aggregation of every individual’s well-being in a society. 
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 38-41 (2002) [hereinafter 
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE]; MARC FLEURBAEY & 
FRANÇOIS MANIQUET, A THEORY OF FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL WELFARE 234 (2011). 
Efficiency means wealth maximization, but in legal scholarship, it has become an 
amorphous concept unmoored from its roots in well-being. See KAPLOW & 
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE at 41. See also infra Section IV.B. 
17 See infra Section IV.D. 
18 See infra Section II.B. 
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A.   Generation versus Transmission of Wealth 
 
In recent years, corporate law scholars have challenged 
shareholder primacy, the notion that corporations exist to serve the 
interests of shareholders.19 As one argument goes, shareholder 
primacy fetishizes shareholder profits, particularly short-term profits, 
to the detriment of all other constituencies.20 Large, activist 
shareholders such as hedge funds might spur a firm to cut its way to 
profitability by laying off employees; then those large shareholders 
might sell their stake before the grave consequences of their strategy 
set in. In response, some academics have refined the primacy norm to 
argue that directors (not shareholders) enjoy primacy,21 while others 
have gone a step further by accounting for employees.22 In a notable 
opinion, the Delaware Chancery Court even speculated whether 
fiduciary obligations should extend to the corporate enterprise as a 
whole, including creditors, when a firm is “in the vicinity of 
insolvency.”23 At their core, such positions reorient the principal-
agent relationship, which forms the bedrock of fiduciary duty, away 
from the focal point of the shareholder. This reorientation works to 
equalize incomes, by directing agents to consider more than 
shareholder profits in the operation of a corporation.24 
This is not to say that shareholder primacy always impedes 
income equality. Corporate reforms eliminating staggered boards, 
reining in executive compensation, and inhibiting boards from vetoing 
takeover bids are all pro-shareholder. These reforms limit the ability 
of executives and board members to steer compensation and also to 
entrench themselves at the expense of shareholder value. If the 
quintessential manager is a highly paid executive and the 
quintessential shareholder is an ordinary investor, then these reforms 
work to level out incomes. 
 
19 For the roots of shareholder primacy, see ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. 
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
20 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 788 (2005). 
21 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, in Research Handbook on the 
Economics of corporate Law (2012); Blair & Stout, supra note 1. 
22 Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and Corporate Structure, 45 STETSON L. 
REV. 69 (2015). 
23 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commun. Corp., 1991 WL 
277613 (Del. Ch. 1991). 
24 This has even led to a movement to explore new corporate forms to accommodate 
social entrepreneurship. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do 
the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 249-50 (2014) 
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Competition policy, too, has recently assumed the mantle of 
redressing inequality. Since the start of the financial crisis, legal 
scholars have debated the role of antitrust in enabling financial firms 
to attain systemic significance.25 Now economists have entered the 
fray to argue that monopoly regressivity is a root cause of inequality.26 
Altogether, these developments challenge the Chicago School 
paradigm, whose central focus in the design and enforcement of 
regulation is efficiency. When the goal of antitrust rules is broadened 
beyond efficiency to include equity and redistribution, inequality 
diminishes.27 For example, a rule that prevents dominant firms from 
merging ends up ceding market share—and, therefore, wealth—to 
smaller rivals.28 So, too, does a rule that prevents a monopoly from 
engaging in predatory pricing to drive out its smaller rivals.29 
Rules governing the generation of wealth are not just 
administered by courts; they are also administered by regulators. For 
instance, competitors can sue under federal and state antitrust laws, 
but the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission play 
prominent roles in intermediating transactions among competitors 
(e.g., by blocking mergers, which transfers wealth from merging 
parties to other market players) or between firms and consumers (e.g., 
by prohibiting deceptive sales practices or supracompetitive pricing, 
which transfers wealth from regulated firms to consumers). In fact, 
business law now interfaces as much with public law as with private 
law, due to the proliferation of regulations governing business 
operations. Thus, financial reform legislation has interposed 
administrative agencies onto a host of business-consumer interactions 
that used to be conceived as purely contractual.30 Even a traditionally 
 
25 See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 557, 558 (2010). 
26 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE: UNEQUAL SOCIEITIES AND 
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THEM (2015); THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S 
DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012) [hereinafter STIGLITZ, PRICE OF 
INEQUALITY]; THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(Goldhammer trans. 2014); ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE 
MANY, NOT THE FEW. But see Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 1171 (2016) (arguing that monopoly power does not have a 
substantial connection to wealth inequality). 
27 Antitrust, too, is concerned with various types of efficiency, but sometimes 
efficiency counsels against enforcement. Here I am tracing the literature that calls 
for more aggressive competition policy, beyond efficiency’s traditional strictures, to 
mitigate economic inequality. See supra note 26. 
28 Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
29 Id. § 2. 
30 E.g., the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which works to redress the 
asymmetry of information between consumers and firms. 
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“private” law matter such as the enforcement of fiduciary duty, 
customarily between private parties before a court, has been made 
“public” in several settings.31 Redistribution under legal rules 
governing business is therefore occurring frequently within the 
regulatory ambit. To the extent that regulators have more information 
at their disposal than courts in administering a legal rule, the 
regulatory turn is a welcome evolution; for regulators can give 
redistribution maximum effect, while achieving both uniformity and 
efficiency. 
In the transmission of wealth, however, redistribution unfolds 
very differently. To be sure, scholars have tried to lay the groundwork 
for trusts and estates to redress inequality. Professor Ascher’s article 
“Curtailing Inherited Wealth” argues that all property owned by a 
decedent should be sold and the proceeds turned over to the 
government, subject to certain exceptions and payment of debts and 
expenses.32 Recently, with the attention on societal inequality, 
academics have called for the wealth transfer taxes to be bolstered and, 
more fundamentally, a critical trusts and estates research agenda to 
incorporate the voices of disempowered groups.33 In this vein, 
Professor Weisbord has proposed ways for Americans—especially the 
poor—to avoid intestacy so as to maintain intergenerational economic 
continuity.34 At the other end of the economic hierarchy, scholars have 
assailed dynasty trusts and asset protection trusts, which lock away the 
wealth of the very rich.35 All of these proposals, however, suffer from 
practical and normative deficiencies. 
As a practical matter, once wealth has been accumulated 
during a testator’s lifetime, the principal mechanism of redistribution 
is the tax system: estate taxes (on the donor’s estate) and inheritance 
taxes (on recipients). Yet over the last few decades, these taxes have 
 
31 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. 23.400 et seq. (business conduct standards for swap dealers in certain derivatives sales); Securities & Exchange Comm’n, Study on 
Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2011) (imposing fiduciary 
duties upon broker-dealers). Recently, however, the viability of the fiduciary rule 
for broker-dealers has come into question. See Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, 
Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama-Era Financial Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2017. 
32 Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990). 
33 See James R. Repetti, supra note 8 (canvassing the literature on estate, gift, and 
income tax arguments); Caron &. Repetti, supra note 3; Crawford & Infanti, supra 
note 4. 
34 See Weisbord, Wills for Everyone, supra note 3. 
35 See Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, The Stripping of the Trust: From Evolutionary 
Scripts to Distributive Results, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 529 (2014); French, supra note 3. 
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been eviscerated. Where once an estate tax rate in excess of 77% 
(beyond a $40,000 exemption) roamed, now a rate of 35% (and an 
exemption of $5 million) hobbles.36 Nonetheless, given recurring 
appeals to resuscitate the estate tax, the academy seems not to have yet 
accepted the political reality that the rollback on this tax is here to stay 
and the repeal imminent.37 
The natural alternative is to look to the myriad of legal rules 
within trusts and estates. This move, too, is fraught with practical 
difficulties. Unlike business law, trusts and estates rarely interfaces 
with regulators. Occasionally a state attorney general might intervene 
in the administration of a charitable trust if there are allegations of 
fraud or misuse of trust assets, but of course, someone must first alert 
the attorney general. Where trusts and estates intersects with 
Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security, and housing programs, there is 
some regulatory oversight, but the legal rules implicated tend not to 
touch upon the core attributes of redistribution explored above: a 
transfer of wealth from rich to poor, ideally by a regulator that can 
gauge the macroeconomic effects of its intervention. In trusts and 
estates, redistribution by rules would seem to be consigned to trust 
litigation and probate proceedings, which is altogether more 
ramshackle.38 
Yet there are redeeming features of trusts and estates’ legal 
rules. When courts go to construe those rules, notions of equity and 
fairness are often at play. Courts emphasize or dispense with will 
formalities and other rules to arrive at results that protect a testator’s 
surviving family members.39 In this way, trusts and estates mirrors the 
enforcement of corporate law, particularly fiduciary duty, where 
courts often stretch to get to a “fair” result that runs counter to black 
letter law.40 Hence, redistribution might be meted out in small doses, 
 
36 For a concise history of the evolution, see Jay A. Soled & Mitchell M. Gans, Asset 
Preservation and the Evolving Role of Trusts in the Twenty-First Century, 72 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 257, 262-72 (2015). On the coalition that fought estate taxes, see 
GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, supra note 11. 
37 See, e.g.., Caron & Repetti, supra note 3. See also Ashlea Ebeling, Will Trump 
Victory Yield Estate Tax Repeal?, FORBES, Nov. 9, 2016. 
38 For now, this Article will sidestep the critique of haphazardness, addressing it 
more in depth in Sections III.B.3 and IV.C. 
39 Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 
(1996) [hereinafter Leslie, Myth of Testamentary Freedom]. 
40 This is why the classical fiduciary duty cases are often so difficult to teach. See, 
e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928); Page v. Page, 55 Cal.2d 192 
(1961) (finding that even though a majority partner could have cut out the minority 
partner, the partner was still bound by the amorphous duty of good faith and fair 
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between parties to a judicial proceeding, but it is redistribution 
nonetheless. 
As a normative matter, however, assigning a redistributive role 
to trusts and estates’ legal rules violates dearly held values that are 
peculiar to the field. Freedom of testation is the “organizing principle 
of the American law of succession.”41 The notion that a testator or 
settlor, having amassed wealth during his lifetime, enjoys the 
discretion to control its disposition is deeply ingrained in American 
society. It is so ingrained, in fact, that ordinary Americans reflexively 
endorse limits on the government’s ability to tax inherited wealth. For 
scholars, calls to curtail dead hand control encounters equally 
passionate opposition premised upon freedom of testation—often at 
the expense of tailored discussions over why dead hand control holds 
any normative significance.42 
Another normative obstacle is the fact that unlike the creation 
of wealth, which tends to involve numerous and diverse parties, the 
transmission of wealth involves fewer parties, who are often 
economically uniform. Wealth generation is the interplay of diverse 
intra-firm constituents ranging from executives to part-time service 
workers, as well as extra-firm diversity of producers varying in degree 
of specialization and market share. Any of these constituents might 
have an equitable claim to a specific party’s wealth. The transmission 
of wealth, by contrast, occurs within a much smaller orbit—typically 
within a family or other similar unit, where the members with an 
equitable claim to the testator or settlor’s wealth are few.43 There are 
some exceptions. Creditor claims cut across trusts and estates law just 
as they do business law. But for the most part, the law surrounding the 
 
dealing in doing so). These analyses often conflate fairness with welfare. In Section 
IV.B, I will attempt to untangle the concepts. 
41 Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 643 (2014); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a (2003). 
42 See, e.g., Kelly, Trust Term Extension, supra note 6, at 89 (“Apart from specific 
arguments, saying that a doctrine may increase (or decrease) dead hand control does 
not have any normative significance. Although many scholars assume that dead hand 
control is bad, asserting that a legal reform may involve dead hand control does not 
tell us anything about whether or not the reform is socially desirable.”); Hirsch & 
Wang, supra note 6, at 5 (“legal regulation of future interests may well require more 
precise calibration according to the attributes of control which testators seek to retain 
in any given case”). 
43 See Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, Book 
Review, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 1160 (2011) (“In most cases, however, children at 
least knew their parents. Maybe, even, in a miniscule number of instances, they 
contributed to a parent’s acquisition of property. Grandchildren, too, generally knew 
their grandparents to at least some extent. But what about great-grandchildren? And 
great-great grandchildren?”). 
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transmission of wealth faces much different normative and practical 
realities than the law surrounding the generation of wealth, differences 
that complicate the redistribution proposition for trusts and estates’ 
legal rules. 
Why, then, should these rules take on the redistribution 
mantle? Simply put, wealth inequality is too complex and too socially 
destructive a problem. The current scheme of income redistribution 
(that is, redistribution at the wealth generation end) and weak wealth 
transfer taxes cannot adequately redress inequality. The patchwork of 
trusts and estate’s legal rules must work to fill the cavernous gaps at 
the wealth transmission end. The next Subsection addresses the 
magnitude of the problem, and the remaining Sections of the Article 
explore and defend the potential solutions. 
 
B.   Wealth Inequality 
 
1.   Conceptualizing wealth as a system 
 
In recent years, academic and policy attention has been 
lavished on income inequality.44 However, wealth is a more holistic 
assessment of inequality than income.45 Income is the earnings of an 
individual over a specific period, but wealth represents accumulated 
assets, typically by families and across generations.46 For instance, 
wealth accrues when decedents pass on their assets to family 
members; in turn, those family members may pass on the unused 
portions of inherited assets to their own beneficiaries. 
Because wealth is compounded across generations and within 
families, it amplifies socioeconomic gaps. Not only do the poor earn 
less during their lifetimes to pass on to survivors than do the rich, the 
poor may have begun life with less advantage, being born to parents 
who inherited little and likely passed on little.47 Not surprisingly, 
 
44 E.g., BRANKO MILANOVIC, INCOME, INEQUALITY, AND POVERTY DURING THE 
TRANSITION FROM PLANNED TO MARKET ECONOMY (1998); RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, 
FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 8-
9 (2010). In 2016, income inequality was a centerpiece of the U.S. Presidential 
election and the United Kingdom’s referendum to leave the European Union. 
45 STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 26, at 2 (“Income inequality data offer 
only a snapshot of an economy at a single moment in time. But this is precisely why 
the data on wealth inequality are so troubling—wealth inequality goes beyond the 
variations seen in year-to-year income. Moreover, wealth gives a better picture of 
differences in access to resources.”). 
46 Strand, supra note 3, at 464-65. 
47 Such is the luck of birth. See MADOFF, supra note 6, at 68; ADAM SMITH, AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book III p 
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wealth gap is greater than income gap; also, not surprisingly, the 
wealth gap tracks racial disparities.48 
Wealth can be construed as a system comprised of two spheres: 
wealth generation and wealth transmission. Similarly, the legal system 
governing wealth can also be broken down into laws governing wealth 
generation and laws governing wealth transmission. To draw the 
analogy further, we can even depict this as a thermodynamic system, 
where overall wealth is neither created nor destroyed but merely 
shifted in response to laws.49 Thus, imperfections in one sphere may 
augment overall imperfection in the system unless corrected 
elsewhere.  
As a concrete example, assume that a dominant entertainment 
conglomerate has built up market power by conspiring to exclude 
smaller rivals in the initial screening of films or by forcing cable 
companies to bundle less desirable channels with popular channels.50 
The majority of stock in the conglomerate is owned and controlled by 
its chief executive.51 During his lifetime, the executive is vastly 
wealthier than any of his firm’s employees. If his succession plan 
transfers his ownership stake to trusts managed on behalf of five of his 
grandchildren, then at the next generation, when the wealth held by 
those five beneficiaries is compared against the wealth held by all the 
successors of all of the firm’s employees, wealth disparity will likely 
be even greater simply because there are proportionately more 
successors of firm employees than successors of the executive. 
Of course, wealth disparity can be fixed with robust estate, 
inheritance, and gift taxes. However, if wealth transfer taxes are 
feeble, then the velocity of disparity will accelerate from one 
generation to the next. Assume, for instance, that a corporation which 
operates discount retail and grocery stores maximizes profitability by 
 
158 (Thomas Nelson ed. 1843) (decrying the foundation of European landed estates 
on the “most absurd of all suppositions . . . that every successive generation of men 
have not an equal right to earth . . . but that the property of the present generation 
should be restrained and regulated according to the fancy of those who died, perhaps 
five hundred years ago”). 
48 Strand, supra note 3, at 466-68. 
49 This is akin to the First Law of Thermodynamics: in a closed system, energy is 
neither created nor destroyed. 
50 See Shalini Ramachandran & Merissa Marr, New Attach on TV “Bundles”: 
Cablevision Says Viacom violates Antitrust rules for How It Groups Cable 
Channels, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2013. 
51 See About National Amusements, National Amusements, Inc., 
https://www.nationalamusements.com/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2016); Keach Hagey & 
Joe Flint, Sumner Redstone’s National Amusements to Call on Viacom and CBS to 
Explore Merger, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2016. 
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paying its employees extremely low (and sometimes discriminatory) 
wages,52 selling products manufactured in countries with low labor 
and environmental protection standards,53 and bribing government 
officials abroad to expedite construction permits.54 The founder 
accumulates so much wealth that his heirs become the richest family 
in the country. Six of the heirs wield more wealth than the bottom 42 
percent of all Americans combined, a proportion that has increased 
with time.55 The heirs might avoid or minimize estate taxes by 
utilizing grantor retained annuity trusts (“GRATs”), where a grantor 
is paid an annuity for a fixed period and any money left over passes to 
his heirs tax-free, and charitable lead annuity trusts (“CLATs”), where 
payments are made to a charity for a fixed period and any money 
remaining passes to an heir with minimal taxes.56 These GRATs and 
CLATs, borne of generous tax loopholes, enable the heirs to pass on 
billions of dollars of assets virtually tax-free generation after 
generation, exacerbating wealth inequality.57 
Admittedly, the thermodynamic model is simplistic. It omits 
an important qualification: no system is completely closed.58 Wealth 
flows into and out of countries, either legally or illicitly.59 After all, 
the cross-border movement of wealth forms the foundation for 
international trade, as well as cottage industries exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities.60 Wealth is simply not created or transmitted in 
 
52 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
53 See S. Prakash Sethi, The world of Wal-Mart, Carnegie Council (2013), 
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0081. 
54 See David Barstow & Alejandra Xanic von Bertrab, The Bribery Aisle: How Wal-
Mart Got Its Way in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012. 
55 See Josh Harkinson, Walmart Heirs Hold More Wealth Than 42% of Americans 
Combined, MOTHER JONES, Jul. 18, 2012. 
56 See Zachary R. Mider, How Wal-Mart’s Waltons Maintain Their Billionaire 
Fortone: Taxes, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 12, 2013; How to Preserve a Family Fortune 
Through Tax Tricks, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 12, 2013; Samuel R. Scarcello, Note, 
Transfer Taxes in Flux: A Comparison of Alternate Plans for GRAT Reform, 107 
NW. U. L. REV. 321 (2012); Kent C. Kiffner, Note, Charitable Remainder Annuity 
Trusts: Why the Internal Revenue Service’s Approach Needs Revision, 54 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 739 (2004). 
57 See Mider, supra note 56. 
58 The analogy to thermodynamics breaks down because unlike energy, wealth is not 
necessarily a zero-sum game in a closed system.  
59 Just as wealth is distributed unevenly within a country, its distribution is also 
uneven among countries. See BRANKO MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING 
INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2005) [hereinafter MILANOVIC, 
WORLDS APART]. In fact, these disparities are the root of outsourcing. 
60 See Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1048-50(2000) [hereinafter Sterk, Asset Protection 
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confined economies. Yet thermodynamic model can still be a useful 
way of thinking through legal rules, by disassembling the legal system 
into a set of laws governing the generation of wealth and another set 
governing the transmission of wealth. When one set spurs 
concentration in wealth and the other does nothing to reduce it, 
concentration will continue unabated.61 
 
2.   Effects of wealth inequality 
 
The effects of wealth concentration tend to manifest over a 
long period, which impedes sustained study.62 For many decades, 
hypotheses abounded on the trajectories of inequality, but 
substantiation was difficult.63 Yet the tools for gauging inequality 
have steadily become more sophisticated.64 We can say with 
 
Trusts]; Red K. Weisbord, A Catharsis for U.S. Trust Law: American Reflections on 
the Panama Papers, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 93 (2016). 
61 Criticisms of the thermodynamics analogy are as valid for the laws governing 
wealth as for wealth itself, since wealth flows to the jurisdictions that regulate its 
transmission the most lightly. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
62 See Repetti, supra note 8, at 835-36; PIKETTY, supra note 26, at 164-68. 
63 See, e.g., Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1 (1955) (hypothesis that inequality tracks the progression of an economy from 
rural to industrial); Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distribution, Political Conflict 
and Economic Growth: A Simple Theory and Some Empirical Evidence, in 
POLITICAL ECONOMY, GROWTH, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 23, 34 (Alex Cukierman et 
al. eds., 1992) (hypothesis that inequality results from high taxes on the wealthy, 
which discourages investment and impairs growth); Charles Garrison & Feng-Yao 
Lee, Taxation, Aggregate Activity and Economic Growth: Further Cross-Country 
Evidence on Some Supply-Side Hypotheses, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 172 (1992) 
(challenging the Alesina & Rodrik hypothesis); BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE 
ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 95 (1999) (hypothesis that inequality is a 
product of the failure to invest in education); Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income 
Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 149 (1996) 
(hypothesis that inequality both causes and results from sociopolitical instability); 
BRANKO MILANOVIC, INCOME, INEQUALITY, AND POVERTY DURING THE 
TRANSITION FROM PLANNED TO MARKET ECONOMY (1998) (case study of inequality 
during the instability of post-Communist transition in Eastern Europe). 
64 One recent work to garner acclaim is PIKETTY, supra note 26. Piketty and his 
colleagues managed to create a fuller picture of wealth distribution by 
supplementing census and other survey data with tax data. Through this compilation, 
they concluded that two factors dictate the composition of wealth—capital and 
income—and the current wealth gap is attributed to stagnant income for most of the 
economy and a relative explosion in capital for the those at the top. For one of the 
many reviews of Piketty’s work, see Paul Krugman, Why We’re in a New Gilded 
Age, N.Y. BOOKS, May 8, 2014. Another prominent figure is the economist Angus 
Deaton, who devoted his career to refining the measurement of consumption as a 
lens for poverty and welfare. For this, Deaton won the 2015 Nobel Prize in Economic 
SUBMISSION COPY 4/26/2017  11:29 AM 
16   
 
confidence and precision that inequality has grown at an alarming clip 
in recent decades, a trend that has only accelerated since the financial 
crisis.65 In fact, our country is more economically unequal today than 
at any point since the Great Depression.66 Along with advances in 
measuring inequality, our alarm over inequality has intensified. 
Inequality hampers economic growth, but there are spillover effects 
into every other imaginable sphere of life—democracy, public health, 
education, and social stability.  
A consensus of empirical evidence shows that the more 
concentrated an economy is, the lower its growth rate.67 Inequality 
constitutes such a formidable headwind to growth that it can arrest the 
momentum of innovation in jolting the economy.68 This is in part 
because feeding the wealth gap means consigning workers to part-time 
jobs with few benefits and no security.69 Simultaneously, top earners 
become closely intertwined with political leaders, from whom they 
extract rents such as tax cuts.70 Consequently, the wealth gap takes a 
 
Sciences. See Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Angus Deaton: Consumption, 
Poverty and Welfare (2015), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/2015/advanced-economicsciences2015.pdf. 
65 For one synopsis, see STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 26, at 2 (“By 
2007, the year before the crisis, the top 0.1 percent of America’s households had an 
income that was 220 times larger than the average of the bottom 90 percent.”). 
During the financial crisis and afterward, recovery was uneven because the wealthy 
tended to be invested in the financial markets (i.e., to recall Piketty’s work, capital) 
and saw their losses rebound quickly, while most Americans had their net worth tied 
up in housing, where pricing rebounded more slowly and unevenly. Id. at 3. 
66 Id. at 5. 
67 See, e.g., Philippe Aghion et al., Inequality and Economic Growth: The 
Perspective of the New Growth Theories, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1615 (1999); Alesina & 
Rodrik, supra note 63; Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful 
for Growth?, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 600, 607, 617 (1994). For a summary of the 
research, see Repetti, supra note 8, at 832-36. 
68 See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. 
STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 605-41 (2016). Admittedly, some 
inequality is inevitable and can actually propel growth. For this conventional view, 
see ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY (1975). 
69 For a heartbreaking anecdote, BRIAN ALEXANDER, GLASS HOUSE: THE 1% 
ECONOMY AND THE SHATTERING OF THE ALL-AMERICAN TOWN (2017) (tracing the 
effect on a town’s working class when its largest employer is bought out by private 
equity). 
70 See Committee for Economic Development of the Conference Board, Crony 
Capitalism: Unhealthy Relations between Business and Government 16 (2015) 
(capital gains taxes as favorable to hedge fund managers); Todd Zywicki, Rent-
Seeking, Crony Capitalism, and the Crony Constitution, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77, 
88 (2015) (arbitrary tax breaks as a product of rent-seeking); WALTER SCHEIDEL, 
THE GREAT LEVELER: VIOLENCE AND THE HISTORY OF INEQUALITY FROM THE 
STONE AGE TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 51 (2017) (the rich owe their success 
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toll on investments in education and health by both the government 
(whose revenues are strapped by tax breaks) and individuals (whose 
incomes are limited by unsteady work), which in turn inhibits long-
term productivity.71  
Sure fixes to inequality include progressive taxation and 
expansive social security,72 but the outsized political influence exerted 
by the wealthy constrains taxes and shreds the social safety net.73 
Instead, government leaders frequently opt for the politically 
expedient alternative of loosening access to credit, so as to dull the 
pain of stagnant wages and shrinking public expenditures.74 This, in 
turn, spurs consumption but creates asset bubbles, which then 
precipitates other financial crises that further widen inequality.75 
Inequality and its pernicious effects are not only closely 
correlated, they are mutually reinforcing. Besides democracy and 
economic growth, the wealth gap also corrodes race relations and 
social stability. More than any other factor, equality in wealth has the 
greatest equalizing effect between Blacks and Whites.76 The wealth 
gap confines many within the minority community to inconsistent and 
substandard housing77 and also saddles them with disproportionate 
court costs,78 which inhibits the stability necessary to build wealth.79 
 
as much to political clout as to anything else). See also STIGLITZ, PRICE OF 
INEQUALITY, supra note 26, at 39-43 (defining and describing rent-seeking). 
71 Long-term productivity closely tracks education and health. See PIKETTY, supra 
note 26, at 21 (“Knowledge and skill diffusion is the key to overall productivity 
growth as well as the reduction of inequality both within and between countries.”). 
72 See ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 179-240 (2015). 
73 On the push to exert political influence, see Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 
572 U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014); JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN 
HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (2016). On 
privatization, see STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY 176-78. 
74 See RAJAN, supra note 44, at 8-9 (2010). 
75 Id. at 21-45. 
76 The sociologist Dalton Conley found that Blacks and Whites diverged in wealth 
holdings even when other factors such as education, age, gender, and previous 
income were controlled for. See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE 
RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 47-49 (10th anniversary ed. 
2010). However, when class measures were equalized, racial differences vanished. 
Id. 
77 MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 
(2016). 
78 Erik Eckholm, Court Costts Entrap Nonwhite, Poor Juvenile Offenders, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2016. 
79 Even more destructive are over-policing and mass incarceration in minority 
communities (which fattens the coffers of privatized prisons) and substantive and 
procedural dilution of their voting rights (which consolidates political power in the 
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Nor is inequality confined to racial minorities. In 2016, voting blocs 
comprised of working-class majority populations unsettled a political 
orthodoxy that had embraced free trade. Rightly or wrongly, this bloc 
attributed its economic demise to globalization; with its support, a 
populist was elected by plurality to the U.S. Presidency, and the 
United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union.80 Unfortunately, 
however, if comparisons are made to societies that exhibit similar 
levels of inequality, these politicians are likely to disappoint voters. 
By the common measure of inequality known as the Gini coefficient, 
the United States is similar to Russia, Turkey, Morocco, and 
Nicaragua, while the United Kingdom is on par with Bosnia, 
Cambodia, Laos, Italy, Estonia, and Sri Lanka.81 Several of these 
comparators are countries whose leaders stoke fiery nationalism even 
as the broader society crumbles.82 
Inequality begets inequality. It spills over “horizontally,” 
exerting a corrosive influence on democracy, education, public health, 
race relations, and social stability. It is also flows “vertically,” passed 
down from generation to generation. A child born into a wealthy 
family will have a leg up in virtually every respect, from nutrition to 
education to future prospects for employment, health, and longevity.83 
Inequality’s pervasive and pernicious effects are therefore a feedback 
loop reinforcing the concentration of economic and political power in 
the hands of the very few at the expense of the great many. 
 
 
hands of wealthy elites). See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); ARI BERMAN, GIVE US 
THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA (2015). 
80 Populism is a claim to speak for “the people” that is antipluralist, critical of elites, 
and rooted in identity politics. See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 
(2016). In 2017, the European Union is bracing itself for the possibility that a 
populist groundswell will catapult right-wing parties to victory in the Dutch, French, 
and German elections. 
81 See Human Development Reports, United Nations Development Programme 
(2013), http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient (search for countries 
which measure at “40,” which corresponds to America’s Gini coefficient, and “36,” 
which corresponds to the U.K.’s Gini coefficient). 
82 Notably, the U.S. and U.K. are redeemed by their high human development 
indicators; hence, they are clustered around countries rated at “very high human 
development.” By focusing on inequality to the exclusion of all other factors, the 
Gini coefficient only presents one dimension of society. 
83 See, e.g., Kirsten Weir, Closing the health-wealth gap: Inequality in the United 
States is undermining Americans’ health and longevity, say experts, AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (2013), 
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2013/10/health-wealth.aspx; Annie Lowrey, Income 
Gap, Meet the Longevity Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2014. 
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3.   Central questions 
 
This Section only presents a snapshot of inequality’s 
consequences. There are a number of other dimensions that cannot be 
fully explored here.84 To maintain focus, this Article distills the 
problem of inequality to a few key questions for trusts and estates law 
scholars.  
First, what is the role of trusts and estates law in sustaining 
inequality? The common thread among the multitude of explanations 
is that laws governing the transmission of wealth are weak (e.g., the 
estate tax) and lax (the use of trusts to build dynasties).85  
Second, who benefits from this legal landscape? The list is 
small—the rich, of course, and their coterie of lawyers and financial 
institutions—when compared against the magnitude of those on the 
losing end—government, creditors, society. 
A third question flows from the above two: What can trusts 
and estates law do? It turns out that the most effective ways to level 
out economic disparity are war, revolution, state collapse, and 
plague.86 Short of those cataclysms, governments can pursue 
progressive taxation, pay parity, social security, and other policies.87 
Yet these measures are insufficient and likely to be eroded over the 
long term. Legal rules governing the transmission of wealth comprise 
a promising second-best solution,88 especially since these rules have 
not yet been explored for their redistributive propensity the same way 
that business law has.  
 
84 For instance, inequality has a geographic dimension. When we speak of inequality, 
we might mean inequality within a country, or among countries, or among the 
worldwide population. See MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART, supra note 59. Inequality 
also has a temporal dimension. To properly contextualize today’s levels of 
inequality, we should step back further to observe the sweep of inequality throughout 
history. See SCHEIDEL, supra note 70; PIKETTY, supra note 26. 
85 See, e.g., Hofri-Winogradow, supra note 35, at 537-51. 
86 See Scheidel, supra note 70. 
87 ATKINSON, supra note 72, at 237-39; STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 
26, at 465-90. 
88 On the origins of the theory of second best, see R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, 
The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). Application 
of this theory to welfare economics posits that if the Pareto-optimum (i.e., first best) 
solution is unattainable because its conditions do not hold, the remaining conditions 
to Pareto optimality need not be pursued. This theory has become popular in the 
debate over double distortion, as a justification for departing from other Pareto 
efficiency conditions (i.e.., legal rules staying out of redistribution) because of 
inefficiencies in the tax system. See, e.g., Matthew Dimick, Should the Law Do 
Anything About Economic Inequality?, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 60-63 
(2016); Sanchirico, supra note 14, at 1017-18. 
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However, we must be careful not to overstate their 
redistributive propensity. As the prior Subsection demonstrates, 
inequality is an affliction whose magnitude can hardly be exaggerated, 
but as the remainder of this Article shows, the rules of trusts and 
estates vary in their redistributive efficiency. Nonetheless, recounting 
inequality’s woes helps to counter the moral force of testamentary 
freedom as an organizing principle for trusts and estates and also to 
reorient the field around an equally pressing imperative: 
redistribution. 
 
III. REDISTRIBUTION BY RULES IN TRUSTS AND ESTATES 
Inequality’s effects are pervasive and pernicious. Yet the legal 
system governing wealth does not adequately prevent inequality at the 
wealth generation end (business law) or the wealth transmission end 
(wealth transfer taxes). Therefore, we must supplement by turning to 
the legal rules within trusts and estates. This Section organizes the 
possibilities for doing so. First, it considers a hybrid system that blends 
elements of private law with the tax system—specifically, the rule 
against perpetuities, which interfaces with estate taxes. Next, this 
Section examines three groups of rules that transfer wealth between 
private parties, without the regulatory arm of the state. Broadly 
construed, these rules affect wealth distribution between trusts and 
creditors (e.g., spendthrift and asset protection trusts), between 
beneficiaries and trustees (e.g., fiduciary duties), and among 
beneficiaries (e.g., abatement, ademption, cy pres, and execution 
formalities). 
Before we proceed, however, a few caveats must be laid bare. 
First, this Article takes a welfare economics approach that analyzes 
the effect of rules on the well-being of individuals, with priority given 
to wealth equality.89 Under this view, redistribution is accomplished 
by transferring wealth from the rich to the poor. This is because the 
marginal utility of increased wealth is greater for the poor than the 
 
89 For the pillars of welfare economics, see, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL 
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY (1973); INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992) [hereinafter SEN, 
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED]. Some scholars have argued that in gauging well-being, 
subjective notions of happiness and justice should not matter at all. See, e.g., JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Social Unity and Primary Goods, in 
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982); 
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY; 
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 16; SEN, INEQUALITY 
REEXAMINED. 
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rich—put differently, the poor (who begin with little wealth) value 
slight increases in wealth more than the wealthy (who begun with vast 
wealth).90 Wealth transfers from rich to poor raise overall social 
welfare, though not necessarily overall wealth. 
Second, welfare economics governs this Article’s conception 
of efficiency. Faced with a choice between two regimes for 
redistribution, we settle on that which distributes wealth most 
efficiently. “Efficiency” typically refers to either Pareto efficiency, 
where no one is made worse off if someone is made better off, or 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, where those made better off can compensate 
those made worse off.91 Pareto efficiency is rare in the real world, so 
most economists and legal scholars settle for Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency.92 But as between two legal regimes, Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency can be indeterminate—that is, the Kaldor-Hicks test could 
justify going from regime A to regime B as much as going from regime 
B to regime A.93 Yet if wealth distribution is factored in, the regime 
that distributes wealth more evenly will prevail.94 Such a result 
satisfies distributive efficiency, rather than Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 
Finally, this Section aims to re-conceptualize trusts and 
estates’ legal rules as tools for redistribution. These rules inevitably 
pit some groups against others (e.g., trusts versus creditors, 
beneficiaries versus trustees); yet the redistributive approach does not 
mean that certain groups will always win. Empirical questions 
regarding relative wealth can help to sort through the rules. More 
fundamentally, this Article adopts approaches from law and 
economics, which has vigorously debated the redistributive potential 
of legal rules in general.95 By doing so, this Article attempts to breathe 
new life into old debates within trusts and estates. The examples in the 
following Subsections are starting points for what will hopefully 
become a broader effort to reimagine the field. 
 
90 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
961, 990-92 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare]. 
91 Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, Book Review, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 
1516-17 (2003). 
92 Id. at 1517-19. 
93 This is because the winners in the change of a A to B could compensate the losers, 
but if the situation were reversed, the winners in the change of B to A could just as 
easily compensate the losers. See id. at 1076 n.1013. 
94 See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 90, at 1076 n.1016 
(“[I]t may be indeterminate whether regime A, in which Jack gets $100 and Jill gets 
$50, or regime B, in which each gets $75, is more efficient, but a social welfare 
function . . . would produce a clear choice. In this example, plausible social welfare 
functions would ordinarily favor the more equal distribution. . .”). 
95 See supra note 14. 
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A.  Private-Rule/Tax-and-Transfer Hybrid: The Rule Against 
Perpetuities 
 
1.   Background 
 
Redistribution can occur either by the public tax-and-transfer 
system (i.e., taxes) or by private law (i.e., legal rules).96 Yet an 
intermediate scheme exists within the dichotomy: a hybrid that has 
elements of both private law and the tax-and-transfer system. For 
instance, one side of the redistribution scheme (the taking or the 
giving) might be accomplished through legal rules, while the other 
might be achieved through taxes or other state action.97 Examples 
include eminent domain, where local government takes property from 
landowners, and voucher systems, where federal or state governments 
convey in-kind benefits to recipients.98 
In trusts and estates, the rule against perpetuities (“RAP”) fits 
within this hybrid model. The RAP is a vestige of common law that 
affects transactions between private parties. The rule states that “a 
contingent future interest must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years 
after the expiration of some life in being when the interest was 
created.”99 In the trusts context, the RAP limits the vesting of assets 
in remote contingent beneficiaries.100 A paradigmatic example is a 
trust that devises property to a succession of life estate holders—e.g., 
the settlor’s child for life, then the child’s children for their lives—and 
then the principal to the contingent remainders—e.g., the settlor’s 
grandchildren.101 If the contingent remaindermen are too remote, the 
trust effectively terminates at the expiration of the last life estate.102 
Such a trust interfaces with the tax-and-transfer system 
through the estate tax and generation-skipping transfer (“GST”) tax, 
which taxes transfers to a settlor’s grandchildren. However, the law 
also includes an exclusion amount that has swelled in recent years by 
 
96 Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient, supra note 14. 
97 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution through Private Law, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 326, 333 (2006). 
98 Id. at 380, 390-96. 
99 Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 1303, 1304 (2003). 
100 At its heart, the RAP balances the freedom of the current generation against the 
freedom of future generations to control property. Thomas P. Gallanis, The Rule 
Against Perpetuities and the Law Commission’s Flawed Philosophy, 59 CAMBRIDGE 
L.J. 284 (2000) [hereinafter Gallanis, RAP]. 
101 Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 99, at 1312. 
102 Id. at 1313 n.36. 
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virtue of indexing for inflation and tax reform.103 The exclusion 
amount for all gift, estate, and GST taxes was $1 million in 2010, $5 
million in 2011, and $5.45 million in 2016; for 2017, it is $5.49 
million.104 Thus, a settlor could evade taxes by creating a trust that 
would last as long as possible, devising $5.49 million (or its inflation-
adjusted equivalent) to a succession of life estates and then a set of 
contingent remainders. Such a trust would be taxed only when it 
terminated, and termination is governed by the perpetuities period 
under state law. 
In recent decades, states have altered or outright repealed the 
RAP. Some jurisdictions have adopted a wait-and-see approach that 
permits waiting for some period to determine whether contingent 
remainders might vest, effectively extending a trust for at least that 
long.105 Other states have adopted the more explicit Uniform Statutory 
Rule Against Perpetuities, which sets a fixed perpetuities period 
ranging from 90 to 1,000 years after creation.106 Most recently, some 
states have abolished the RAP outright.107 The ensuing trusts created 
under such regimes can last in perpetuity, while also avoiding estate 
and GST taxes.108 Such trusts are called “perpetual trusts” or “dynasty 
trusts.” 
 
2.   Redistributive reforms 
 
 
103 See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act, 
Pub.L. 111–312, H.R. 4853, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010). 
104 That’s New – Estate and Gift Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/whats-new-estate-
and-gift-tax. 
105 See, e.g., 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6104 (2006); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2131.08(C) (Supp. 
2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.27, §501 (2002); Restatement (Second) of Property 
(Donative Transfer) § 1.3. 
106 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14-2901 (2009); Cal. Prob. Code §§21200 et seq. 
(West Supp. 2016); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§15-11-1101 et seq. (West Supp. 2016); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§45a-490-496 (West Supp. 2016). See also Lawrence W. 
Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 
90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (1988); Jessie Dukeminier, The 
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. 
REV. 1023 (1987). 
107 See, e.g., 37 Idaho Code §55-111 (2008); S.D. Codified Laws § 43-5-8 (2017). 
108 In fact, empirical evidence suggests that perpetual trusts—and abolition of the 
RAP—arose in response to the GST tax. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. 
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis 
of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005) [hereinafter Sitkoff & 
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds]. 
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Defending the RAP from the current onslaught is a natural—
and efficient—starting point for redressing wealth inequality within 
trusts and estates. There are a number of ways to bolster the RAP, 
ranging from cautious to sweeping. Straightforward solutions include 
taxing dynasty trusts,109 legislating dynasty trusts out of existence,110 
and reinstating the RAP so as to abolish the inter-state race to the 
bottom.111 Admittedly, these may be politically infeasible because 
they require drastic legislative action. A more moderate change is to 
give courts the ability to tinker with dynasty trusts, such as a cy pres 
power to modify or terminate trusts that do not increase net social 
welfare.112 More cautious still, reforms can target the measuring lives 
of the RAP—for instance, limiting beneficiaries to no more than two 
generations beyond the grantor,113 rather than resorting to the arcane 
malpractice trap of “lives in being.”114 Of course, additional empirical 
and technical analysis must be conducted to settle on the best 
approach. 
Overall, the RAP should occupy a central role in our 
redistribution project. A quick glimpse of the opposing sides of 
perpetuities reform reveals why. Dynasty trusts are roundly 
condemned by most commentators.115 Advocates of the rule’s repeal 
 
109 Joel C. Dobris, Undoing Repeal of the rule Against Perpetuities: Federal and 
State Tools for Breaking Dynasty Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2537, 2541-42 
(2006). 
110 Id. at 2542. 
111 Id. at 2545-46. On the jurisdictional competition to eliminate the RAP, see 
Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule against 
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003); Sitkoff & 
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds, supra note 108. 
112 See Dobris, supra 109, at 2546, n.42; Ronald Chester, Modification and 
Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet 
Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697, 724 (2001). 
113 This approach to revitalize the RAP is reflected in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROPERTY, § 27.1 (2011), which adopts the recommendations in Daniel M. 
Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?, 56 MICH. L. REV. 
683 (1958); Thomas P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 513, 549, 559-560 (2003). 
114 On the rule’s technical difficulties, see e.g., G. Graham Waite, Let's Abolish the 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 93, 97 (1992); Keith L. Butler, Long 
Live the Dead Hand: A Case for Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities in 
Washington, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1237, 1238 (2000); Paul G. Haskell, A Proposal for 
a Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. REV. 545, 545 
(1988). Of course, if perpetuities reform is not animated by the bar’s fear of 
malpractice (and it is not), then this reform will not forestall the RAP’s erosion. 
115 See, e.g., Joel C. Dobrs, The Death of the Rule against Perpetuities, Or the RAP 
Has No Friends, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000); Sterk, Jurisdictional 
Competition, supra note 111; Dukeminier & James E. Krier, supra note 99. 
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tend to be a much smaller group of either financial institutions or estate 
planning attorneys.116 Substantively, however, there is in the RAP a 
confluence of factors not found elsewhere in the field. 
First, as a mode of redistribution, the RAP is particularly 
efficient. The RAP affects the wealthy—those settlors who can create 
a dynasty trust with the requisite corpus of $5.49 million. Further, the 
RAP singles out settlors with dynastic aspirations.117 The RAP also 
interacts with wealth transfer taxes. This nexus permits the state to be 
involved; as illustrated above with regulators in business law, the state 
has more information than a court regarding the macroeconomic 
effects of distribution. All in all, the RAP facilitates a transfer of 
wealth from the very rich (when it forces a trust to terminate and be 
subjected to estate and transfer taxes) to the poor (by virtue of 
distribution in the tax system). 
Second, because the RAP represents a hybrid model that aligns 
closely with estate and GST taxes, the distortionary effect of the rule 
on the parties involved is not as severe as a rule which operates wholly 
outside the tax system. The “double distortion” argument holds that a 
rule which redistributes income compounds the economic distortions 
already present in the tax system.118 Therefore, legal rules should aim 
for efficiency, leaving redistribution to the tax system.119 The 
counterarguments challenge double distortion’s premises and posit 
that deficient tax systems must be supplemented with redistributive 
 
116 See Grayson M. P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40 
Pepp. L. Rev. 1291 (2013); Waite, supra note 114. 
117 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, 
AND INHERITANCE LAW 14 (2009) (“some of the most arcane and mysterious rules 
find their explanation, ultimately, in their impact on dynastic wealth”); Hirsch & 
Wang, supra note 6, at 33 (“more extensive powers of serial distribution . . . create 
an opportunity for the testator to satisfy her dynastic ambitions”); McCouch, supra 
note 116, at 1300 (“promotional literature [for perpetual trusts] is replete with thinly 
veiled appeals to settlors' vanity and dynastic aspirations”). 
118 This argument is most closely associated with Professors Louis Kaplow and 
Steven Shavell. See Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient, supra 
note 14. However, it descends from a line of political philosophy traceable to John 
Rawls. See RAWLS, supra note 89, at 245 (“[I]nheritance is permissible provided 
that the resulting inequalities are to the advantage of the least fortunate and 
compatible with liberty and fair equality of opportunity . . . [F]air equality of 
opportunity means a certain set of institutions that assures similar chances of 
education and culture for persons similarly motivated . . .”). 
119 Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient, supra note 14, at 667-
68. 
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legal rules.120 For our current purposes, we can reduce double 
distortion to its essential argument: the tax system is the most efficient 
way to address inequality, and legal rules are inefficient when they 
attempt to do the same.121 Yet when the tax system departs from 
optimal efficiency, the ancillary legal rules no longer produce efficient 
results if they remain in their optimal states.122 By extension, legal 
rules must assume the distributive mantle (and therefore depart from 
the efficient state of eschewing distribution) to correct for flaws in the 
tax system. To give a concrete example, we might say that 
redistribution in trusts and estates is best accomplished by a 
combination of estate, gift, and GST taxes. We might also say that the 
balances struck by the RAP should not contemplate distributive ends 
whatsoever.123 Yet when the tax system fails to transfer wealth from 
the rich to the poor,124 the legal rule has to step in to offset that 
inefficiency in the tax system.125 Hence, the RAP must stand as a 
bulwark against dynasty trusts, to compel their termination and 
taxation at some point.126 
Third, much of the wealth held in trusts is capital—financial 
instruments, equity in enterprises, and real estate.127 To the extent that 
a differential in capital and income drives inequality,128 unlocking 
 
120 See, e.g., David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All Of) Labor, Income, 
Consumption, Capital Income, and Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355 (2015); Sanchirico, 
supra note 14; Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 14; Dimick, supra note 88. 
121 This is more systematically explored by Kaplow and Shavell in a series of works 
that frames fairness and welfare as mutually exclusive. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, 
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 16; Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 90. 
122 See Dimick, supra note 88, at 63. 
123 Instead, it should focus on balancing the interests of current and future 
beneficiaries. But this is far from clear. See Gallanis, RAP, supra note 100, at 292 
(economic, rather than normative arguments, best support the RAP). 
124 E.g., because legislative capture allows tax exclusions to be raised and rates to be 
reduced year after year. 
125 I.e., inefficient from a welfare economics perspective because the system raises 
overall inequality. Distributive efficiency is distinguishable from efficiency in 
general, which “denote[s] that allocation of resources in which value is maximized.” 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (7th ed. 2007). 
126 This complementary relationship between the RAP and taxes is similar to that 
between income and consumption taxes, which his animated much of the double 
distortion debate. See Gamage, supra note 120. 
127 See John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United 
States?, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 1069, 1072 (2007) (“the characteristic trust asset has ceased 
to be ancestral land and has become instead a portfolio of marketable securities”). 
128 PIKETTY, supra note 26. Piketty’s findings have been criticized for not 
sufficiently distinguishing between capital and land. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, New 
Theoretical Perspectives on the Distribution of Income and Wealth Among 
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assets sequestered in trust for taxation or productive use can at least 
allow some of the assets to be redistributed.129 
There are, however, potential criticisms of the RAP as a 
redistribution mechanism. One line of criticism is inherent to hybrid 
schemes generally—the two sides of the scheme, the “rich” and the 
“needy,” never directly interact but only deal with the state.130 There 
is no fostering of relationships, as there is in a legal rule that affects 
two private parties.131 Further, the efficacy of the scheme depends as 
much on the robustness of estate taxes as on the perpetuities period; 
where tax exemptions are large and tax rates slim, the redistributive 
effects of the RAP will be hampered. Finally, from a practical 
perspective, upon the termination of a dynasty trust, beneficiaries may 
simply redeposit the assets into other trusts.132 Nonetheless, even if all 
of these criticisms ring true, limiting the duration of dynasty trusts will 
enable the generation of some tax revenue, which can then be 
redistributed. Additionally, the RAP also must not be analyzed in 
isolation; it is the RAP in conjunction with asset protection trusts that 
wrecks the most havoc upon wealth equality.133 
 
B.   Purely Private Legal Rules 
 
Purely private legal rules constitute another mode for 
redistribution. For this, trusts and estates is a particularly fertile 
realm—here the law is comprised of a myriad of rules. This 
Subsection focuses on three groups of rules: redistribution from 
 
Individuals, in INEQUALITY AND GROWTH: PATTERNS AND POLICY 2-3 (Kaushik 
Basu & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2016). 
129 In some sense, this is a variation of the old justification for the RAP that it keeps 
trust property in the stream of commerce, to be put to productive use rather than to 
fester. See Garrett Moritz, Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
116 Harv. L. Rev. 2588, 2597 (2003); Waite, supra note 114, at 96. This argument 
assumes that “unlocked” assets will be put to productive use rather than deposited 
in trust and, furthermore, that productive use directly benefits the poor rather than, 
say, the assets being pledged as collateral for loans to develop land, which then 
widens inequality. 
130 Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 97, at 390-92. 
131 See id. at 392. 
132 Scott Andrew Shepard, A Uniform Perpetuities Reform Act, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 89, 103-04 (2013) (“If we assume minimal competence on the part of 
the beneficiaries (or their attorneys and financial advisors), then we can expect them 
simply to redeposit that res in trusts indistinguishable from the trust just concluded-
-in no way diminishing the dynasty family's aggregate wealth.”). 
133 Dobris, supra note 109, at 2539 (“the toxic combo is perpetual trusts and asset 
protection trusts”). 
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settlors and beneficiaries to creditors; redistribution between trustees 
to beneficiaries; and redistribution among beneficiaries.134 
 
1.   Beneficiaries/settlors versus creditors: Spendthrift and 
asset protection trusts 
 
a.   Background 
 
Spendthrift and asset protection trusts apportion wealth 
between settlors and beneficiaries on one hand and creditors on the 
other. A spendthrift trust—or, more precisely, a trust with the 
“disabling restraint” of a spendthrift provision135—prevents the sale, 
assignment, and alienation of a beneficiary’s interest in a trust.136 The 
restraint bars immediate consumption of the interest either by the 
beneficiary selling the interest for a lump sum or by a creditor levying 
execution against the interest. Thus, if a plaintiff has successfully sued 
a trust beneficiary for sexually assaulting her child and broadcasting 
the assault over the Internet, the plaintiff cannot reach the trust assets 
to satisfy the judgment if the trust contains a spendthrift provision.137 
Ostensibly, the settlor of the trust inserted spendthrift language to 
insulate the assets, perhaps because the settlor did not trust the 
beneficiary with unfettered access. 
If, however, the trust were self-settled—created by a settlor to 
shield assets from his own creditors—then the settlor and the 
beneficiary are one and the same.138 Now the creditor is a creditor to 
the settlor. A self-settled spendthrift trust is more commonly known 
as an asset protection trust (“APT”). American laws were initially 
reluctant to recognize APTs since the notion of a debtor creating a 
vehicle to protect assets from his creditors smacks of fraudulent 
 
134 Some of these legal rules also intersect with the tax system. For instance, transfers 
to APTs might trigger tax implications. See Karen E. Boxx, Gray’s Ghost—A 
Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1195, 1241-51 (2000); 
Randall J. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to “Asset Protection” Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 
987, 1005-08 (1999). In this sense, these rules are hybrid modes of redistribution, 
and the same considerations explored above will apply. However, the remainder of 
this Subsection explores the private dimensions of these rules—that is, only 
redistribution among the parties affected by the rules.  
135 Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive 
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts]. 
136 See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 417-20 (4th 
ed. 2010); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(b) [hereinafter UTC]. 
137 Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A. 2d 410 (NH 2001). 
138 See Boxx, supra note 134, at 1198. 
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conveyance.139 Yet as offshore jurisdictions validated APTs and assets 
started flowing abroad, American states began to follow suit.140 This 
precipitated a “race to the bottom” for trust assets and trust 
administration similar to the competition for corporate charters in state 
corporate law.141  
A statute that recognizes APTs can thwart creditor recovery by 
narrowing the fraudulent transfer exception,142 shortening the statute 
of limitations on claims,143 and barring enforcement of foreign 
judgments.144 Thus, if promoters of a telemarketing Ponzi scheme 
were sued by the Federal Trade Commission, the promoters could 
transfer their assets to an offshore APT organized under the permissive 
laws of the Cook Islands, and the Commission would have limited 
recourse.145 The promoters’ assets would lie beyond the reach of a 
U.S. court because they rest in a jurisdiction unwilling to tap trust 
assets to satisfy foreign judgments.146 
Notably, spendthrift provisions and APTs are subject to 
conditions. Both sets of legal rules feature exceptions protecting the 
claims of certain creditors—typically, spouses seeking alimony and 
children seeking support.147 In some states, the exceptions for 
spendthrift trusts are expanded to claims by providers of necessities 
and also of services to protect trust beneficiaries’ interests.148 APTs, 
because they are inherently more reprehensible, permit additional 
carve-outs. These include prohibitions against fraudulent transfers and 
requirements of irrevocability.149 
 
b.   Redistributive reforms 
 
139 UTC § 505 cmt. See generally 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM 
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156, at 164-86 (4th ed. 1987). This 
view is still reflected in the Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code. See 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 58(2) & cmt. b (2003); UTC § 505(a)(2). 
140 See Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 60, at 1047-55. 
141 Id.  
142 E.g., by requiring that the settlor was insolvent when the creditor claim arose. See 
International Trust Act (1984) § 13(B) (1996) (Cook Islands). 
143 Id. at § 13(B)3(b). 
144 Id. at § 13(D). 
145 I.e., contempt sanctions. See Federal Trade Commission v. Affordable Media, 
LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999); Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra 
note 60, at 1102-03. 
146 See Affordable Media, 179 F.3d. 
147 See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 503(B)(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 
59(a). These limitations are common to the general scheme of trusts and estates.  
148 See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 503(B)(2); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 
59(b). 
149 See 12 Del. Code §§ 3570, 3571. 
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For spendthrift provisions and APTs, the key to redistribution 
lies in their exceptions and conditions—which, if rigorous, prevent 
settlors from fully shielding their assets. Enabling recovery by certain 
creditors such as spouses and children operates to shift wealth from 
beneficiaries and settlors. So, too, does a hard and fast requirement 
that spendthrift trusts be irrevocable. The most embattled exception, 
though, is fraudulent transfer: under fraudulent conveyance law, 
transfers made to hinder creditor claims can be set aside.150 While this 
law has traditionally covered both actual and constructive fraud by 
debtors,151 at least one state now requires creditors to prove actual 
fraud.152 Shoring up the fraudulent transfer exception to encompass 
constructive fraud by grantors helps to shift wealth to creditors. The 
exception can also be fortified by recognizing the claims of both 
current and future creditors.153 
Either way, fraud is still difficult to prove, as most corporate 
practitioners can attest.154 This shortcoming extends to trusts and 
estates as well.155 Moreover, fraudulent conveyance had stood for 
centuries as the doctrinal justification for barring self-settled 
spendthrift trusts,156 the view being that it was beyond the pale for a 
debtor to thwart creditors by creating a trust for his benefit.157 The 
advent of foreign, and then domestic, APTs chipped away at that 
 
150 U.F.C.A. ss 4, 6, 7, 7A U.L.A. 474, 507, 509 (1918); U.F.T.A. ss 4, 5, 7A U.L.A. 
652-53, 657 (1984). This is espoused in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act of 
1917 (“UFCA”) and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act of 1984 (“UFTA”), which 
has supplanted the UFCA in many states. 
151 See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act §§ 4(a)(1), 4(a)(2). 
152 See Alaska Stat. §§ 34.40.010. 
153 The UFTA already does this. See UFTA § 4(a); Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, 
supra note 60, at 1045. However, some states limit the exception’s efficacy by 
undercutting the statute of limitations for claims against trusts. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. 
§ 34.40.110(d)(2); Boxx, supra note 134, at 1223-24. 
154 Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 60, at 1046-47. But see Jeffrey A. 
Schoenblum, In Search of a Unifying Principle for Article V of the Uniform Trust 
Code: A Response to Professor Danforth, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2609, 2611 (2006) 
(“As long as fraudulent conveyance laws are enforced and not easily evaded, the 
settlor will not be able to impair creditors’ access to the trust assets.”). 
155 See Boxx, supra note 134, at 1241 (“[F]raudulent conveyance claim is difficult 
for a plaintiff to establish, and, if the transfer falls short of the definition of fraudulent 
conveyance, the legislation has harmed the creditor by giving the debtor a relatively 
painless way to put assets beyond the reach of the creditor.”). 
156 That is, if we trace the roots of fraudulent conveyance (as many commentators 
do) to the English Statute of Elizabeth, enacted in 1570. See 5 Debtor-Creditor Law 
æ 22.03 (Theodore Eisenberg ed., 1999). 
157 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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modicum of propriety as states adopted a series of mechanisms 
curtailing the ability of creditors to recover.158  
This should not imply that pro-creditor reforms are out of 
reach. Because APTs provoke uncommonly sharp ire, proposals to 
rein them in do not suffer from lack of imagination. Those proposals 
include Constitutional challenges to APTs,159 as well as federal 
reforms to bankruptcy160 and Medicaid,161 which would pre-empt state 
APT law. More fanciful still are calls to criminalize transfers to 
offshore APTs and to limit these trusts to jurisdictions bound by treaty 
to cooperate with the United States.162 These proposals are unlikely to 
transpire since they require tremendous political will on the part of 
federal and state legislators, who are already prone to capture. More 
realistic are acts of judicial resistance within the bounds of existing 
law.163 In this regard, one viable alternative is for judges to liberally 
utilize contempt sanctions for settlors who refuse to turn over assets 
sequestered in APTs to satisfy judgment.164 
Rather than put up procedural barriers to spendthrift trusts, 
another way forward is to expand recovery for additional subsets of 
creditors. Indeed, this may be an important first step in the exploration 
of the distributive efficiency of spendthrift trust exceptions, because it 
forces us to consider the relative wealth of the parties involved.  
As in business law, trusts encounter two types of creditors: 
contract creditors and tort creditors. The treatment of these two groups 
is not parallel. In corporate law, a creditor who has secured judgment 
against an undercapitalized enterprise can “pierce the corporate veil” 
by going directly to the equity holder to satisfy judgment. The creditor 
 
158 See supra notes 142-44, 152 and accompanying text. See also John K. Eason, 
Policy, Logic, and Persuasion in the Evolving Realm of Trust Asset Protection, 27 
Cardozo L. Rev. 2621, 2655-61 (2006); Gingiss, supra note 134, at 1008-12. 
159 See Boxx, supra note 134, at 1230-31 (Contract Clause), 1208-10 (Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, for recognition of out-of-state judgments); U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, 
cl.1. 
160 See Eason, supra note 158, at 2668-70 (exploring the eventually unsuccessful 
proposal, as part of the debate surrounding the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, to cap APTs at $125,000). 
161 Id. at 2679-82 (speculating on whether the Medicaid program will eventually 
limit the ability of applicants to utilize APTs in the qualification process). 
162 See Gingiss, supra note 134, at 1008. 
163 See Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 
Mich. L. Rev. 1791, n.45 (2003) (“[P]ublic choice problems might make it easier to 
use the courts than the legislature for redistribution. Certainly, recent rounds of tax 
legislation have not been an edifying spectacle.”). 
164 But see Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 60, at 1102-03 (contempt 
sanctions have limited long-term effect). 
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might be seeking recovery for an unpaid bill165 or a tort injury.166 A 
successful case can strip the limited liability protection for enterprise 
equity holders. 
Empirical studies show that veil piercing cases are more 
successful if brought by contract creditors than tort creditors.167 This 
may be for practical reasons. Courts tend to permit veil piercing when 
the facts indicate misrepresentation, and misrepresentation is easier to 
substantiate with a prior course of dealing that leaves a document 
trail.168 By contrast, the tort setting does not implicate 
misrepresentation. This empirical finding belies strong normative and 
theoretical arguments to the contrary. Tort creditors should be more 
successful precisely because there is no course of dealing through 
which they can extract safeguards.169 Instead, the interaction is 
typically unexpected and wholly involuntary, so there is no chance to 
demand a premium from a tortfeasor-beneficiary in exchange for any 
limitations on recovery.170  
The absence of recourse for involuntary creditors is decried by 
detractors and supporters of spendthrift trusts alike.171 Bankruptcy, 
corporate, and tort law reflect similar criticisms.172 Nevertheless, 
legislatures are inconsistent when they enact spendthrift trusts; some 
jurisdictions protect involuntary creditors, while others do not.173 An 
unequivocal exception would serve as a mode of redistribution. 
The distributive efficiency of a tort creditor exception depends 
on the relative wealth of tortfeasor-beneficiaries and tort victim-
creditors. Decades ago, it was charged that spendthrift trusts “permit 
 
165 See, e.g., Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1991).  
166 See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (NY 1966) 
167 See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1044 (1991). 
168 Id. at 1064-65, 1068-70. 
169 See Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 
2685, 2694 (2006) [hereinafter Hirsch, Fear Not the APT]; Hirsch, Spendthrift 
Trusts, supra note 135, at 77-79. 
170 Thus, in the corporate setting, scholars have argued for unlimited shareholder 
liability for tort claims, but so far, lawmakers have not been persuaded. See Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1916-23 (1991). 
171 See, e.g., Boxx, supra note 134, at 1257-59; Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra 
note 60, at 1073; Hirsch, Fear Not the APT, supra note 169, at 2692-94; Hirsch, 
Spendthrift Trusts, supra note 135, at 77-79. 
172 E.g., Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound, 93 B.U. L. REV. 89 (2013); Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 89 (1985); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 170; Lynn M. Lopucki, The 
Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 45-47 (1996). 
173 See Eason, supra note 158, at 2661-62. 
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children of rich men to live in luxury and debt.”174 While the dollar 
amounts protected by spendthrift trusts are hard to pin down, it is 
estimated that that spendthrift trusts, APTs, and trusts in general hold 
astronomical wealth for their beneficiaries.175 On the other hand, 
victims of environmental torts—and perhaps even intentional and 
negligence torts—tend to be drawn from poor (and minority) 
communities.176 On average, then, settlors and beneficiaries of these 
trusts may well be wealthier than tort creditors. 
These empirical questions must be answered with precision for 
the tort creditor exception to work. In fact, empirical “indeterminacy” 
is a major obstacle to the enhancement of social welfare by way of 
legal rules.177 However, once these questions are answered, the 
exception may be refined. For instance, if victims of environmental or 
strict liability torts tend to be uniformly poor, then perhaps the 
exception to spendthrift and asset protection trusts should extend only 
to creditors pursuing satisfaction of judgment for those torts.178 In any 
event, a tort creditor exception is a good place to start. As scholarship 
develops on redistributive potential of piercing the spendthrift trust, 
analysis can widen to exceptions for contract creditors. However, 
empirical and theoretical inquiries will be more complicated because, 
among other things, contract creditors might be more economically 
diverse. 
 
2.   Beneficiaries versus trustees: Fiduciary duties 
 
So far, this Section has contemplated legal rules primarily 
through the lens of distributive efficiency. Yet there are many rules in 
trusts and estates where the analysis is fraught with other concerns that 
 
174 Willard M. Bushman, The (In)Validity of Spendthrift Trusts, 47 ORE. L. REV. 304, 
312 (1968). 
175 See Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It’s Time to Codify the Compromise, 
72 NEB. L. REV. 179, 182 n.16 (1993); Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 60, 
at 1036. 
176 See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Racism and Invisible Communities, 96 W. 
VA. L. REV. 1037 (1994); Tsachi Keren-Paz, An Inquiry into the Merits of 
Redistribution through Tort Law: Rejecting the Claim of Randomness, 16 CAN. J.L. 
& JUR. 91, 94-95 (2003); Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 
785, 799-800 (1990). 
177 See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 90, at 1375-76. 
178 Similarly, in a comparative negligence regime, where defendants lose if they are 
careless, it might be hypothesized that tortfeasors are comparatively better off than 
tort victims. After all, tortfeasors lose if they are careless, and those with a lower 
marginal utility for damages (i.e., the rich) are likelier to be careless than those with 
a greater marginal utility for damages (the poor). 
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muddle the redistributive calculation. One such concern is fairness, 
which includes notions of justice, equity, rights, and related concepts 
but not social welfare.179 To explore the intersections and divergences 
of fairness and welfare, this Subsection evaluates the redistributive 
propensities (and limitations) of fiduciary duties, which govern 
relations between beneficiaries and trustees. 
 
a.   Background 
 
Fiduciary duties determine the legal boundaries of agents’ 
behavior toward their principals. The officer-shareholder relationship 
in a corporation, for example, is an agency relationship where officers 
are bound by fiduciary duties.180 So, too, are the partner-
partnership,181 investor-investment adviser,182 and executor-estate 
relationships.183 For trusts in particular, fiduciary duties evolved to 
protect beneficiaries from trustees. As in all agency situations, the 
interests of beneficiaries and trustees can be misaligned. Distinctive 
features about trusts amplify the potential for trustees to behave badly: 
trustees hold legal but not beneficial title in trust property, which may 
lead them to pursue imprudent investment strategies, while 
beneficiaries often lack the capacity or knowledge to be able to 
monitor trustees.184 
Over time, agency law devised a number of duties for agents—
specifically, the duties of (1) loyalty, (2) care, (3) good faith and fair 
dealing, (4) disclosure, (5) accounting and maintenance of the 
principal’s funds, (6) good conduct and obedience, and (7) 
indemnification.185 Of these, only loyalty, care, and, depending on the 
jurisdiction, sometimes good faith and disclosure count as fiduciary 
 
179 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 16, at 38-45; 
Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 90, at 999-1005. 
180 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 
(1994); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984). 
181 See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21; REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 404(b), (c) 
[hereinafter RUPA]. 
182 See Investment Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6; SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
183 See, e.g., In re Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977). 
184 See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 621 (2004) [hereinafter Sitkoff, Agency Costs Theory]; Lusina Ho, Trusts: The 
Essentials, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST 17-20 (Lionel Smith ed. 2013). 
185 See J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND 
THE LLC: THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (8th ed., 2011). 
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duties,186 obliging the agent “to act primarily for the benefit of” the 
principal.187 Within this subset, the paramount fiduciary duty is 
loyalty, described as “stricter than the morals of the market place,” 
“the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,” “unbending and 
inveterate,” and uncompromisingly rigid.188  
In trusts, elements of the duty of loyalty constitute a 
“mandatory core” that cannot be eviscerated by contract.189 Most 
prominently, Section 1008 of the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) bars 
an exculpation clause that (1) “relieves the trustees of liability for 
breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to 
the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries”190 or (2) 
“was inserted as the result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship to the settlor.”191 The first prohibition, on 
exculpation for bad faith and recklessness, is reflected in corporate 
law.192 The second prohibition essentially requires that exculpations 
be made in good faith.193 Finally, Section 1008 compels exculpations 
(3) be “fair under the circumstances” and “adequately communicated 
to the settlor.”194 This third mandate, of fairness and adequate 
disclosure, also has analogs in business law.195 At its core, it embodies 
our tastes and preferences for fairness in fiduciary law.196 After all, it 
might well be Kaldor-Hicks efficient for a trustee to compensate the 
principal for a waiver by lowering fees or agreeing to take stewardship 
of complex assets. Yet the UTC refuses to reduce exculpations to an 
efficient-transaction analysis. Thus, even though a libertarian 
 
186 See HYNES & LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 185. Sometimes good faith is subsumed 
within other duties, and sometimes it is separated out as a standalone duty. Cf. AM. 
LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (good faith is part of 
the duty of care); RUPA 404(d) (good faith as separate duty); Stone v. Ritter, 911 
A.2d 362, 370 (Del.) (duty of loyalty encompasses good faith). 
187 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 13, comment a. 
188 Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 464. 
189 See UTC §§ 1008, 105(b)(10); John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law 
of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1105, 1123 (2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory 
Rules]. 
190 UTC § 1008(a)(1) 
191 UTC § 1008(a)(2). 
192 See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 102(b)(7) [hereinafter DGCL]. 
193 See Langbein, supra note 189, at 1123. 
194 UTC § 1008(b). 
195 See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 390 (agent acting on own account must 
still deal fairly and disclose); RUPA § 404(d) (partner must discharge duties 
consistent with good faith and fair dealing); DGCL § 144(a) (material facts of a 
conflicted transaction must disclosed, and transaction must be fair). 
196 See Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, Review Essay, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1992 (2002). 
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revolution has swept through business law to render most fiduciary 
duties waivable,197 in trusts the duty of loyalty has never fully 
succumbed to contractarianism.198 And the requirements of good faith, 
fairness, and disclosure form a buffer against contractarian creep.199 
We should not lose perspective. Viewed against the grand 
scheme of trusts law, Section 1008 is more an anomaly than a buffer. 
The libertarian revolution has permeated trusts as thoroughly as it has 
business law; the core fiduciary duties of loyalty,200 impartiality,201 
and care202 have become mere defaults that can be modified by 
settlors.203 This is not surprising. If loyalty, the pinnacle of the 
fiduciary standard, can be broadly (though not completely) waived, 
then lesser duties can be obliterated.204 In corporate law, for example, 
this means that an agent’s duty of care is not simply the reasonable 
man standard from negligence law; to prevail on breach of care, a 
plaintiff needs to prove conduct somewhere in the vicinity of gross 
negligence205 and also to overcome procedural obstacles in the 
business judgment rule206—assuming that charter does not insulate 
agents from breach of care.207 
 
197 See RUPA § 103(b)(3) (partnership agreement may authorize act that would 
breach duty of loyalty and may identify acts that do not violate loyalty, if certain 
conditions are satisfied), 103(b)(5) (partnership agreement may prescribe standards 
to measure good faith); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (limited liability 
company agreement can eliminate fiduciary duties except acts that constitute bad 
faith or violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing); DGCL § 102(b)(7) 
(corporate charter can eliminate fiduciary duty except for the duty of loyalty and 
good faith, among other things). In trusts, self-dealing cannot be cured by co-trustee 
approval. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at 513. However, it is acceptable 
if authorized by the terms of the trust, approved by the court, or consented to by the 
beneficiary. UTC § 802(b); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt. c. 
198 See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 192. 
199 Elsewhere in trusts law, there are also duties to inform. E.g., the UTC mandates 
certain disclosures of trustees that cannot be waived. See id. at §§ 105(b). See also 
T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595 (2007). 
200 UTC § 802(a); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959). 
201 UTC § 803; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 232 (1959). 
202 UTC § 804; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959). 
203 Or, more precisely, these duties are not designated as mandatory by the UTC, 
which supports the conclusion that they are waivable. See Langbein, Mandatory 
Rules, supra note 192, at 1122. 
204 We also trust agents to be careful more than we trust them to be loyal. See 
POSNER, supra note 125, at 441. 
205 See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
206 See In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Deriv. Litig., 2009 WL 481906 (Del. Ch. 
2009). 
207 See DGCL 102(b)(7) 
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In trusts, the duty of care takes a slightly different turn. A 
trustee must still administer the trust “as a prudent person would,” 
exercising “reasonable care, skill, and caution.”208 However, there are 
additional overlays for “prudence” in the investment of trust assets. 
Because trust assets are becoming increasingly financialized, two 
questions frequently arise: what are the parameters for the delegation 
of trust functions, and what are the requirements for the investment of 
trust assets? As to the first question, the modern trend is to permit the 
delegation of essential investment functions.209 As to the second, the 
modern trend is also more permissive. The conservative “prudent man 
rule,” which emphasizes preservation of trust funds and derivation of 
income210 and at one time shied away from stock,211 has been 
supplanted by the “prudent investor standard,” which evaluates risk 
not in isolation but on a portfolio basis.212 The new standard 
incorporates the Modern Portfolio Theory to confront, and even 
embrace, financial risk, so long as it is properly diversified.213 
A breach of fiduciary duty can be remedied by damages, 
known as a “surcharge,” against the offending trustee.214 Surcharges 
can take the form of lost profits215 or appreciation damages,216 and 
 
208 UTC § 804. 
209 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE (1992) 
(delegation permitted) and UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT (1994), 7B U.L.A. 16 
(Supp. 1995) (delegation permitted) [hereinafter UPIA], with RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 171, 224(2)(b). For the academic debate, see John H. 
Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 641 (1996); Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: 
Fiduciary Standards and Trust Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713 (2006); Stewart 
E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent Is Modern Prudent Investor 
Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (2010). 
210 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227; Harvard College v. Armory, 26 
Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830). 
211 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. m (1959). 
212 UPIA § 2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE. 
213 On the academic and policy debate, see Joel C. Dobris, Speculations on the Idea 
of “Speculation,” in Trust Investing: An Essay, 39 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 439 
(2004); C. Boone Schwartzel, Is the Prudent Investor Rule Good for Texas?, 54 
BAYLOR L. REV. 701 (2002). 
214 See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s 
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great West, 103 COLUM L. REV. 1317, 1352-
53 (2003). 
215 E.g., if assets are improperly retained or acquired. See Schwartzel, supra note 
213, at 810-17; Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1383, 1390 (Colo. 1989). 
216 E.g., if a fiduciary improperly sells estate assets, in a conflicted transactions, for 
less than market value. See Matter of Estate of Mark Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 321-
22 (1977); Matter of Estate of Janes, 90 N.Y.2d 41, 55 (1997). 
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they can be imposed if the trust suffers no loss217 or if the trustee 
makes no profit.218 Where the duty of loyalty has been abrogated, 
courts often mete out damages that overcompensate an aggrieved 
principal, so as to deter errant agents.219 This is, in part, because self-
dealing and other disloyal behavior is so difficult to uncover. 
 
b.   Redistributive reforms 
 
Empirical questions will dictate how fiduciary duties can be 
reconfigured for redistribution. Trustees are diverse, as are 
beneficiaries. Family members and friends are often called upon to 
serve as trustees; what they lack in investment expertise, they redeem 
in awareness of settlor and beneficiary dynamics.220 Of course, with 
the financialization of trust assets, settlors are looking to professional 
trustees with greater frequency. Even then, however, it can be difficult 
to discern the relative wealth of trustees and beneficiaries.221 
For the above reasons, it cannot be said that a blanket 
prohibition on contracting out of fiduciary duties serves distributive 
ends efficiently. There may well be normative reasons for resisting the 
evisceration of trustee fiduciary duties.222 From a welfare economics 
perspective, however, fiduciary duties are too indeterminate to justify 
a wholesale assault or defense of the contractarian trend.223 In other 
words, we cannot confidently claim that holding trustees to inflexible 
duties of care, loyalty, and good faith adequately shifts wealth from 
rich to poor. Nor can we confidently claim the opposite—that allowing 
those duties to be waived is an effective means of redistribution. 
Unexpectedly, the modern trend in the Third Restatement may 
strike the right balance: authorize the delegation of investment 
 
217 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205(a); Coster v. Crookham, 468 N.W.2d 
802, 806-07 (Iowa) (1991). 
218 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205(b) (1992); UTC § 1002(a)(1). 
219 See, e.g., Tarnowski v. Respo, 51 N.W.21 801 (Minn. 1952). 
220 See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at 580 (discussing considerations in the 
selection of trustees). 
221 Another evaluation, implicated by the Modern Portfolio Theory but not directly 
addressed here, is the relative wealth of current versus future trust beneficiaries. To 
the extent that the transition from the prudent man regime to the Modern Portfolio 
Theory favors current over future beneficiaries, see Schwartzel, supra note 213, this 
inquiry may also be relevant to redistribution. 
222 See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of 
Default Rules, 94 Geo. L.J. 67, 70 (2005) [hereinafter Leslie, Trusting Trustees] 
(“labeling fiduciary duties ‘default rules’ threatens to strip fiduciary rules of their 
moral content”). 
223 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 16, at 457-58. 
SUBMISSION COPY 4/26/2017  11:29 AM 
2017]      ASYMMETRIES IN WEALTH 39 
 
functions,224 but discipline the wayward trustee with lost-profit 
damages.225 With this combination, investment professionals are 
likelier to assume the helm; yet their violations of duty trigger 
damages that transfer of wealth back to beneficiaries. 
If professional trustees are wealthier on average than trust 
beneficiaries, then additional modifications can be made. Rather than 
reinstating a prudent man standard or prohibiting waivers on fiduciary 
duty (which would divert wealth from lay trustees to beneficiaries), 
fiduciary law could hold professional trustees to a higher standard.226 
Additionally, lost profits could be awarded more liberally—for 
example, to remedy breaches of the duty of care in addition to the duty 
of loyalty.227 Finally, the causal link for damages could be relaxed. 
The current view adopts a proximate cause analysis to surcharging 
trustees: if losses would have occurred in the absence of a breach of 
trust—say, because the entire market moved downward, not just the 
portfolio’s investments—then the causal link is severed.228 This view 
effectively treats breach of fiduciary duty as a tort, which in corporate 
law has been controversial for its burdens on shareholder-plaintiffs.229 
 
3.   Beneficiaries versus beneficiaries: Abatement, ademption, 
 cy pres, and execution formalities 
 
Rules that govern relations among beneficiaries comprise a 
fourth category of rules in trusts and estates. These rules perform a 
variety of functions, but overall, they work to resolve ambiguities in 
wills and trust instruments. This Subsection utilizes abatement, 
ademption, cy pres, and execution formalities to explore the 
redistributive potential of this category of rules.230 
 
224 See supra note 209. 
225 See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text. 
226 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 cmt. a (1959) (“if the trustee has 
a greater degree of skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is liable for a 
loss resulting from the failure to use such skill as he has”). This view was not wholly 
rejected by the UTC. See UTC § 804 cmt. (“This section appropriately bases the 
standard on the purposes and other circumstances of the particular trust.”). See also 
id. § 806; UPIA § 2(f). 
227 On the traditional reluctance to do so, see, e.g., Matter of Janes, 90 N.Y.2d at 55. 
228 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. f (1959). 
229 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (requiring 
proof that breach of care proximately caused shareholder losses is contrary to well 
established Delaware precedent on a plaintiff’s burden of proof in duty of care 
cases). 
230 This list is not exhaustive of the category. We could also add other rules such as 
incorporation by reference, which determines whether devises made without 
testamentary formalities (e.g., written on a separate notebook) are part of the general 
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Using these rules to effectuate redistribution is likely to attract 
the criticism of haphazardness in two ways.231 First, redistribution 
unfolds only when certain ambiguities plague wills, and then only 
among the beneficiaries who are implicated.232 Second, the rules may 
effectuate wrong-way redistribution that favors the well-off and 
exacerbates inequality.233 
 
a.   Background 
 
One subset within this category is rules of construction 
triggered by ambiguities in “devises,” or bequests. Abatement, for 
example, occurs when a testator’s estate is too small to satisfy all 
devises. Rules of abatement establish a hierarchy for satisfying devises 
unless a will provides otherwise.234 During probate, the court classifies 
all devises—bequests of a specifically described item are “specific,” 
bequests paid out of the estate’s general assets are “general,” and all 
other bequests in a will are “residuary.”235 The rules typically stipulate 
that residuary devises “abate” (i.e., are extinguished or reduced pro 
rata) first, then general devisees, and finally specific devises.236 
Hence, the order of abatement protects specific devises. Yet the order 
can be altered to meet policy objectives. At least one legislature has 
determined that devises to spouses enjoy first priority, so that they 
abate after specific devises.237 
Ademption proceeds in the reverse order, so that specific 
devises are extinguished first.  If a specifically devised asset is not 
found in the estate, then the devise has “adeemed” (failed).238 
 
scheme of distribution, see UPC §§ 2-510, and lapse, which determines whether a 
devise to a beneficiary who has passed away before the decedent must fail or go to 
alternate takers, see UPC § 2-603. 
231 Haphazardness is a criticism of legal rules found throughout the double distortion 
literature. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the 
Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing 
Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 832 (2000). 
232 See Sanchirico, supra note 14, at 1051 (“potential objection to redistribution by 
private-law rules begins with the assertion that the redistributive event in the private 
law is random rather than periodic, and narrowly focused rather than broad-based”). 
233 Id. at 1055. 
234 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-902 [hereinafter UPC]; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra 
note 136, at§ 8.4. 
235 MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at 340-41; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROPERTY § 5.1 (1999). This excludes demonstrative devises, which exhibit a blend 
of specific and general traits. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at 341. 
236 See supra note 230. 
237 See, e.g., Iowa Code § 633.436. 
238 See UPC §§ 2-606, 2-609; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at§ 8.2. 
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However, two alternatives enable the specific devisee to take 
something nonetheless. First, state law can construe ademption 
narrowly, permitting beneficiaries to inherit the value of an 
extinguished devise unless the will provides otherwise.239 Second, 
when one beneficiary is pitted against another, a probate court can 
classify ademption and specific devises narrowly or broadly to favor 
the more sympathetic beneficiary.240 
Finally, a devise to a charitable organization can be frustrated 
if the organization becomes defunct. To fulfill a generalized 
philanthropic intent, courts invoke the cy pres doctrine to transfer the 
bequest to another charity.241 Cy pres enables redirecting trust funds 
to alternate institutions,242 modifying trusts to work around tax law 
changes,243 and eliminating racial and religious restrictions in 
devises.244 As a type of equitable power to modify trusts, cy pres can 
apply to a plethora of situations, though some scholars assert that it is 
not utilized enough.245 More than the other rules of construction, an 
aggressive use of cy pres is not likely to encounter academic 
opposition because it likely achieves both donor intent and 
efficiency.246 
The other subset within the category of rules governing inter-
beneficiary relations pertains to will execution formalities.247 Every 
state sets forth formalities that must be met when a will is executed 
(e.g., how a will should be signed and witnessed). These strictures date 
to the medieval Statute of Wills248 and perform four key functions of 
wills.249 Yet, punctilious as they may seem, formalities do yield to 
other considerations. Formalities can bend for holographic and 
electronic wills, where other indicia of authenticity exist and courts 
 
239 This is the result in jurisdictions that have adopted the UPC. See UPC § 2-606. 
240 See, e.g., McGee v. McGee, 122 R.I. 837 (1980). 
241 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959) (“[I]f the settlor m 
manifested a more general intention to devote the [trust] property to charitable 
purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the application of the property 
to some charitable purpose that falls within the general charitable intention of the 
settlor.”).; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at 445-50. 
242 See Estate of Crawshaw, 249 Kan. 388 (1991). 
243 See UTC § 416. 
244 See Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); 
Howard Savings Inst. v. Peep, 170 A.2d 39 (N.J. 1961). 
245 See LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 129 (1955). 
246 See POSNER, supra note 125, at 441. 
247 See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at §§ 4.1-4.5. 
248 See id.; Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. 8, c.1 (1540).  
249 I.e., the protective, channeling, evidentiary, and ritual functions. See MCGOVERN 
ET AL., supra note 136, at 198-99. 
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take liberties to avoid the alternative of intestacy.250 Even more 
unsettling, courts can play up or minimize the failure to abide by 
execution formalities to arrive at the natural outcomes.251 
 
 
b.   Redistributive reforms 
 
Rules of construction and execution formalities can facilitate 
redistribution in two ways: through broad, ex ante prescriptions by 
legislatures or through specific decisions by courts during ex post 
litigation. An example of wholesale legislative reform is the 
adjustment to abatement priorities favoring surviving spouses.252 Yet 
it is hard to imagine another interest group either powerful enough or 
sympathetic enough to successfully lobby for such a carve-out. 
Moreover, in the abstract, inter-beneficiary rules are likely to be 
indeterminate—that is, it cannot be generalized that one type of 
beneficiary is sufficiently wealthier that we should set applicable rules 
to a default position that transfers wealth away from these 
beneficiaries. Doing so may lead to wrong-way distribution in which 
the winners were wealthier than the losers from the outset.253 
The other way to redistribute by these rules is through courts 
in probate and trust litigation. Where a will is ambiguous or its 
execution ceremony deficient, courts could construe rules to benefit 
the economically worse-off party. In an ademption setting, a court 
could classify as general (instead of specific) those devises to the 
poorer beneficiary. If a devise to a charitable organization failed, a 
court exercising cy pres power might consider the relative economic 
stations of the will’s residuary beneficiaries versus the populations 
who would be served if the devise passed to an alternate charity. 
There is precedent or taking these liberties. Classification of 
devises is an imprecise endeavor; interpreting similarly drafted 
provisions, two courts could come out diametrically.254 Some of the 
 
250 “Holographic wills are wholly handwritten by the testator.” Id. at 212. See, e.g., 
Zhao v. Wong, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1198 (1995). Electronic wills are created, signed, 
and/or executed on an electronic medium. See, e.g., In re Estate of Javier Castro, 
2013-ES-00140 (Ct. Comm. Pl. Lorain Cnty., Probate Div., Ohio, June 19, 2013). 
251 I.e., outcomes that cohere with probate judges’ preconceptions of what most 
testators want—usually to take care of close family members. Leslie, The Myth of 
Testamentary Freedom, supra note 39. 
252 See supra note 237. 
253 See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 90, at 1375-76. 
254 Compare Halsam v. Alvarez, 70 R.I. 212 (1944), with In re DeVoss, 474 N.W.2d 
542 (Iowa 1991). 
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iconic cases on rules of construction result in beneficiaries who had 
been provided little to nothing under the will prevailing over 
beneficiaries who had already received much of the estate.255 
Execution formalities, too, can bend to arrive at “just” results.256 
Finally, there is even an efficiency dimension to the cy pres doctrine, 
whose application tends to enhance the welfare of the many at the 
expense of a few beneficiaries.257 If in each of these circumstances, if 
equity and efficiency justifications were replaced or supplemented 
with redistributive considerations, then these rules too could be 
enlisted in the struggle against inequality. 
The attractiveness of these rules lies in their application. 
Courts can weigh the relative wealth of the beneficiaries on a case-by-
case basis. The rules can also foster positive interactions among 
beneficiaries, prompting settlement or dialogue to resolve their 
differences.258 Yet here lies the vulnerability of the rules as well. 
These rules do not apply as broadly as tax laws, and they would only 
redistribute among the beneficiaries who are affected. Hence, their 
redistribution is haphazard—of random and limited effect.259 The 
retort to this criticism is that these rules are merely one facet of a 
broader strategy to overhaul all rules governing wealth. Small as their 
effect might be, they can fill gaps overlooked by the tax system as well 
as other rules. 
Another criticism is that the redistributive burden will fall to 
the beneficiaries of testators who cannot afford expert draftsmen. 
Slipshod lawyers are more prone to committing the ambiguities and 
errors that trigger these rules, but the ultra-rich do not hire such 
lawyers. The generic response to this observation, which is of little 
consolation, is that the tax system is also rife with loopholes.260 In this 
 
255 See, e.g., McGee, 122 R.I. (devise of bank account balances to grandchildren, 
who already received stock, deemed specific and therefore abated so that friend of 
decedent could receive $20,000); Clark v. Greenhalge, 411 Mass. 410 (1991) 
(separate notebook of testatrix deemed incorporated by reference into the will so that 
a sentimental painting goes to testatrix’s friend rather than her nephew, who already 
received much of the estate). Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the 
prevailing beneficiaries are poorer overall than the losing beneficiaries. 
256 See Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, supra note 39. 
257 See POSNER, supra note 125, at 441. 
258 See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 97, at 390 (“[Redistribution by rules] is more 
conducive to advancing objective goods such as self-respect, accomplishment and 
appropriate relationships; enhances the recipients’ valuation of the things they have 
been given; and may decrease both the givers’ opposition to the redistribution and 
the injury to their welfare.”).  
259 See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text. 
260 See Sanchirico, supra note 14, at 1013. 
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way, the rules approximate the tax system, where savvy lawyers and 
financial planners help the rich avoid taxation, leaving the burden to 
the rest of us.261 Legal rules, in other words, are not unique in this 
aspect.  
Like other lines of criticisms and counterarguments sampled in 
this Article, the exchanges explored above derive from the double 
distortion discourse over whether rules or taxes are better at 
redistribution. This discourse is not tailored enough to rules governing 
inter-beneficiary disputes to be useful for our purposes. These rules 
may well shift the redistributive burden to estates that cannot pay 
fancy lawyers, but they may also capture a segment of smaller estates 
that are overlooked by reforms to the RAP, APTs, and fiduciary duties. 
More holistically, all of these reforms should be integrated into a 
model that factors in concerns unique to the rules governing the 
transmission of wealth. The next Section undertakes this objective. 
 
IV. ASSEMBLING A UNIFYING THEORY 
This Article has proposed several reforms to the legal rules of 
trusts and estates to combat inequality. Yet to assemble a truly 
unifying theory on the laws governing wealth, one that integrates trusts 
and estates with business law, several additional questions must be 
addressed. First, how should we tolerate doctrinal divergences in the 
laws governing the transmission of wealth versus the laws governing 
the generation of wealth? Second, should the legal rules of trusts and 
estates defer at all to notions of fairness? Third, how do the reform 
proposals rank in distributive efficiency? 
 
A.   Doctrinal Asymmetries and Spillover Effects 
 
Several of the reforms explored in this Article will take trust 
law out of synchronization with business law. For instance, the 
proposed constraints on spendthrift and asset protection trusts are 
more aggressive than their analogs in corporate law regarding limited 
liability. This is in part because fraudulent conveyance and 
misrepresentation are too weak for distributive purposes in trusts and 
estates.262 Hence, if these proposals are adopted, we may see more tort 
 
261 See Alan Rusbridger, Panama: The Hidden Trillions, N.Y. BOOKS, Oct. 27, 2016 
(The economic system is, basically, that the rich and the powerful exited long ago 
from the messy business of paying tax . . . . They don’t pay tax anymore, and they 
haven’t paid tax for quite a long time.”) (quoting Luke Harding, The Guardian; 
internal quotations omitted). 
262 See supra notes 154-55 and 169 and accompanying text. 
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creditor exceptions in trusts and estates than in corporate law.263 
Similarly, proposals to raise duty of care standards and damages for 
breach do not align with corporate law, which confers directors and 
officers with substantive and procedural protections that encourage 
risk-taking.264  
These asymmetries may produce spillover effects. One 
possibility is that business law will follow suit by bolstering creditor 
protections and tempering contractarianism. This would vitiate 
modern trends, but it is not wholly improbable, given that concerns 
about inequality are prompting similar calls for reform in business 
law.265 After all, this is how law often changes: an early mover, 
venturing into unfamiliar terrain, ends up prompting a paradigm 
shift.266 The opposite possibility is that the limited liability and 
fiduciary duty contractarianism of corporate law could rein contrary 
trends in trusts, so that redistributive reforms would be short-lived. 
Equally likely, the reforms may not spill over at all. Instead, 
the asymmetries may become ingrained, so that parallel doctrines in 
business law and trusts and estates end up treading different paths. 
After law, contract law (the basis for corporate law) and trust law 
evolved separately to begin with.267 
Trust law exceptionalism has been the subject of intense 
debate for nearly a quarter-century.268 In 1998, Professors Hansmann 
and Mattei published a pair of articles arguing that trust law’s central 
contribution is its asset partitioning function.269 Partitioning enables 
assets to be pledged in separate bundles to different classes of 
 
263 See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text. Again, the denial of remedy to 
involuntary creditors has troubled corporate commentators enough to propose 
constraining limited liability in business law as well. See Hansmann & Kraakman, 
supra note 170. 
264 In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Deriv. Litig., 2009 WL 481906 (business 
judgment rule). 
265 See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text. 
266 Indeed, in trusts, contractarianism took off because of initial forays in corporate 
law, after which other fields followed suit. 
267 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 222, at 73-76. 
268 If you count the associated debate over whether trust law is contractarian, this 
history stretches back over a century. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian 
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L.J. 625, 643-50 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, 
Contractarian Basis](chronicling the debate between Frederic Maitland and August 
Scott). 
269 See See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A 
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434 (1998) 
[hereinafter Hansmann & Mattei, Functions of Trust Law]; Trust Law in the United 
States: A Basic Study of Its Special Contribution, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 133 
(1998). 
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creditors,270 a function that cannot be replicated by contract.271  The 
corollary—that fiduciary duties are a less convincing explanation for 
trust law’s distinctiveness, since they can be reproduced as a body of 
contracts—has proven to be far more controversial.272 Hansmann and 
Mattei’s thesis can be read as a variation on the “end of history” 
arguments that were circulating in the early post-Cold War era, when 
ebullient scholars predicted worldwide convergence in political 
systems,273 corporate law,274 and apparently trusts and enterprise 
organization.275 In another sense, however, their thesis is a 
continuation of the attempt by scholars to read contractarianism—or, 
as Professor Langbein would argue, to re-read contractarianism—into 
trusts law.276 Either way, the central question is whether trusts law is 
distinct enough to merit its divergence from trends in corporate law. 
Answering “no” are the contractarians.277 Answering “yes” are 
scholars who emphasize trust law’s moral content,278 unique history 
and dynamics,279 and the primacy it places upon fiduciary duties.280 
 
270 Hansmann & Mattei, Functions of Trust Law, supra note 237, at 438. 
271 Id. at 453. 
272 For criticisms, see, e.g., Thomas P. Gallanis, The Contribution of Fiduciary Law, 
in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST (Lionel Smith ed. 2013) [hereinafter Gallanis, 
Contribution of Fiduciary Law]; Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law as Fiduciary 
Governance Plus Asset Partitioning, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST (Lionel Smith 
ed. 2013); Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 222. 
273 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). 
274 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001). 
275 See Hansmann & Mattei, Functions of Trust Law, supra note 237, at 479 (“We 
are left, then, with the question whether the differences between [trusts and 
corporates] are in any way fundamental, or whether the roles now served by these 
two forms could both be served as well by a single legal form that by itself imposes 
little beyond the asset partitioning that is their lowest common denominator . . .”). 
276 Langbein argued that the contractarian basis was in trusts law all along, though 
Scott took the field on a tangent. See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 236, 
at 644. The precursors were FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996), and, of course, Ronald Coase, 
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). The trust-law-as-default-rules 
analysis extended by Sitkoff, Agency Costs Theory, supra note 184, and, if we 
include law and economics analysis of trusts more broadly, Kelly, Restricting 
Testamentary Freedom, supra note 5. 
277 E.g., Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 236; Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom 
of Testation/Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180 (2011). 
278 E.g., Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 222. 
279 E.g., id.; Deborah S. Gordon, Trusting Trust, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 497 (2015). 
280 E.g., Gallanis, Contribution of Fiduciary Law, supra note 240. Gallanis also 
argues that fiduciary duties cannot easily be replicated by contract. 
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This Article embraces a more functional approach to trust law 
exceptionalism. It takes no position on whether trusts are grounded in 
moral obligation or unique history. Instead, this Article hitches the 
field’s claim of uniqueness to utilitarianism—that is, trust law is 
unique because it has to be unique. Given the gravity of inequality’s 
consequences and the inability of trusts and estates to counteract 
inequality through the tax system, the legal rules must step in, even if 
it fosters inconsistencies in doctrines shared with business law. 
 
B.   Fairness versus Welfare 
 
If the law were only to serve distributive ends, its results would 
defy our sense of fairness.281 Fairness encompasses justice, equity, 
rights, and related concepts; under the technical formulation of 
Professors Kaplow and Shavell, fairness is everything that is not 
welfare.282 Welfare, meanwhile, is shorthand for social welfare, which 
is the aggregation of every individual’s well-being in society.283 Over 
a decade ago, Professors Kaplow and Shavell asserted provocatively 
that the law should only serve welfare, disregarding fairness 
altogether.284 As expected, this austere endorsement of utilitarianism 
was denounced by scholars who argue that law should at least partially 
reflect moral norms.285 One recurring criticism among the detractors 
has been that fairness better captures our preferences than welfare; 
hence, the welfare calculus should make room for noneconomic 
considerations such as fairness.286 
In trusts and estates, normative principles are so deeply 
embedded that a single-minded pursuit of redistribution would be 
scorned. The overriding principle in the field is testamentary 
 
281 See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 90. 
282 See id. at 38-41. 
283 Id. at 24-28. 
284 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 16. 
285 On the placement of Kaplow and Shavell’s argument within the deontic-
utilitarian debate, see Coleman, supra note 91. On how Kaplow and Shavell fit into 
the consequentialist and welfare spectrum, see Christopher P. Taggart, Fairness 
versus Welfare: The Limits of Kaplow and Shavell’s Pareto Argument, 99 MARQ. L. 
REV. 661 (2016). 
286 Farnsworth, supra note 196, at 2015-18. Curiously, the efficiency-only position 
seems to have been rejected long ago in the welfare economics literature on which 
Kaplow and Shavell base their argument. See FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra note 
16, at xv (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2nd 
ed., 1963)). 
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freedom,287 which so dominates conceptions of fairness that limiting 
principles are exceedingly rare.288 This is not to suggest, though, that 
testamentary freedom cannot be abridged on equity grounds. For 
example, Professor Leslie has shown that courts can bend will 
formalities to ensure that surviving family members are provided for, 
regardless of whether the testator’s will does so.289 Apart from 
testamentary freedom, fiduciary duties too are pregnant with moral 
and ethical obligations.290 
The normative vocabulary—or, if we adopt Kaplow and 
Shavell’s succinct definition, fairness—therefore pervades trusts and 
estates. Consequently, the reduction of beneficiary-beneficiary 
relations to a distributive function (i.e., the fourth category of legal 
rules) would surely offend our sense of fairness. Testamentary intent 
would be routinely vitiated. Poor beneficiaries might be viewed as 
receiving a windfall if they had led a life of inebriation or sloth or 
treated the testator badly. To the extent that our well-being is enhanced 
by the law’s pursuit of fairness,291 and to the extent that these results 
strike us as unfair, overemphasis on redistribution in these 
circumstances would be cavalier. 
The path to a unifying theory therefore cannot completely 
disregard fairness. The strategy must be to “weaken fairness 
requirements until they capture basic, sensible, and perhaps context-
specific ethical objectives that are compatible with efficiency 
requirements.”292 Of course, more work must be done on the extent to 
which fairness should defer to welfare. Once the proper balance is 
struck, we can turn to the equally complicated task of devising feasible 
policy.293 
 
287 See supra note 41. Note, however, that testamentary freedom and fairness do not 
always align. 
288 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (“[T]he right to pass on property—
to one’s family in particular—has been part of the Anglo-American legal system 
since feudal times . . . . [T]otal abrogation of the right to pass property is 
unprecedented and likely unconstitutional.”). For this reason, the limitations on 
testamentary power are themselves limited. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, 
at Ch. 3. Certainly inequality-based justifications have previously met with little 
success, due to the reliance on progressive taxation. See id. at 133. 
289 See Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, supra note 39. 
290 See Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 222. 
291 Farnsworth, supra note 196, at 2015-16; Coleman, supra note 91, at 1512-13. 
292 FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra note 16, at 235. 
293 Complications include setting the right incentives to get the parties involved to 
communicate their preferences (economic and non-economic) to judges and 
lawmakers, as well as the political feasibility of deviations from the status quo. See 
id. at 236. 
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C.   Distributive Efficiency 
 
If we were to construct a hierarchy on the distributive 
efficiency of the reforms explored in this Article, the RAP and 
exceptions to APTs would occupy the top rung. In combination, 
dynasty trusts and APTs have permitted settlors to squirrel away some 
trillions of dollars.294 Dynasty trust and APT reform are attractive in 
that the distribution flows from the very wealthy. Where these rules 
intersect with the tax system, there is the additional benefit that 
distributions can flow to the weighted priorities built into public 
programs—assuming that we trust the government with adequately 
weighting its distribution for maximum redistributive efficacy.295 
Yet we should not abandon redistribution at the more granular 
level of inter-beneficiary relations. The fourth category of trusts and 
estates’ rules might only transfer wealth between two discrete parties 
affected by litigation. Nonetheless, as part of a holistic model 
integrating the tax system, business law, and other rules in trusts and 
estates, inter-beneficiary distributions capture what the other schemes 
omit. Put metaphorically, if every bucket has holes, then water (i.e., 
wealth) is best caught by nesting buckets together with different 
holes.296 In this rubric, even “weakly redistributive” results that 
transfer wealth between discrete parties in litigation can play a role.297 
 
294 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds, supra 
note 108, at 404 & n.125 ($100 billion in trust assets moved from the abolition of 
the GST tax and 2003); Alan Rusbridger, Panama: The Hidden Trillions, N.Y. 
BOOKS, Oct. 27, 2016 ($7.6 trillion in wealth is deposited in tax havens globally) 
(citing economist Gabriel Zucman). For an account of one creditor’s foray into the 
world of offshore APTs, see Nicholas Confessore, How to Hide $400 Million, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2016. 
295 Welfare economics can pursue a variety of allocations. For instance, an allocation 
can give absolute priority to the worst-off member of a society. However, imagine 
the following hypothetical: the absolute worst-off member has a utility measurement 
of 8.9, 1000 people comprising the next worse-off group measure at 9.1, and the 
other 1000 members of society measure at 100. Absolute priority to the worst off 
overlooks the next worse-off. It is up to policymakers to derive a priority that weighs 
these considerations appropriately. See Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and 
Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745, 752-52 (2003) (citing THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL 
QUESTIONS 125 (1979)); FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra note 16, at 39-45. 
296 See Sanchirico, supra note 14, at 357. For more technical explanations, see 
FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra note 16, at 
297 I borrow the “weakly redistributive” terminology from the welfarist conception 
of weak Pareto efficiency, in which one allocation is better than another if each of 
the relevant actors prefers it. See id. at 8. 
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Legitimately, critics might denounce wealth transfer schemes 
premised upon litigation as inefficient because the fail to provide clear 
ex ante prescriptions and instead incentivize lawsuits.298 Yet from the 
standpoint of administrative efficiency, probate judges have insights 
into the preferences and relative wealth of the relevant parties at a level 
of intimacy that administrative agencies simply do not.299 From the 
standpoint of feasibility, wholesale transfers crafted by legislatures 
may simply be impossible. 
Within this distributive efficiency rubric, fiduciary duties sit 
somewhere in the middle, between the RAP and APTs on one end on 
rules of construction and execution facilities on the other. Reforms to 
fiduciary duties are likelier to be more indeterminate.300 On these 
points and also the design of empirical research to address 
redistributive indeterminacy, future work must follow. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article lays the foundation for a theory of inequality that 
unifies laws regulating the generation and transmission of wealth. It 
also evaluates the redistributive potential of the legal rules within 
trusts and estates. With proper justification, the goal of welfare 
enhancement can overcome the field’s entrenched notions of fairness 
such as freedom of testation. This Article proffers the perils of 
inequality as such a justification, perils severe enough to also merit 
doctrinal divergences in business law and trusts and estates. 
Further work is needed to resolve the distributive 
indeterminacy of the rules. Empirical research in particular could 
establish a ranking of the distributive efficiency of reforms proposed 
in this Article. Notwithstanding such a ranking, the best result may be 
all-encompassing, nesting the weakly redistributive mechanisms 
within more sweeping ones. 
The ultimate goal is to harness the redistributive potential of 
trusts and estates. Much of the law and economics discourse on 
redistribution by legal rules unfolds abstractly,301 with boilerplate 
 
298 See Mark L. Ascher, The 1990s Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, Or 
More Like the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1993) (decrying 
litigation incentives in the UPC). 
299 Or agencies simply cannot achieve this intimacy of knowledge without huge 
expenditures. See Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 14, at 11. 
300 See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. 
301 For instance, Kaplow and Shavell popularized the exploration of fairness versus 
welfare through abstract tort-law hypotheticals. See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness 
versus Welfare, supra note 90, at 1039. In turn, critics have responded with abstract 
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defenses arguing that the tax system is just as difficult to administer as 
legal rules and just as susceptible to forum selection.302 Similarly, 
welfare economics can quickly descend into obscure theorems and 
mathematical proofs.303 Welfare economics and law and economics 
provide the framework, but the content must be filled out by diving 
into the rules, norms, and efficiencies of the specific context. 
Hopefully, this Article comprises the beginning of a larger movement 
to do so for trusts and estates. 
 
hypotheticals from other areas of law. See, e.g., Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 
14. 
302 See, e.g., Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 14.  
303 For a valiant attempt to keep the proofs simple, see FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, 
supra note 16. 
